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I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil has long been a magnet for foreign investment. With
more than $20 billion in registered direct foreign investment and
reinvestment,1 Brazil is by far the largest repository of foreign in-
vestment in Latin America. Foreign investors have been attracted
by Brazil's large market, enormous natural resources, rapid eco-
nomic growth, relatively inexpensive labor supply, generous tax
and credit subsidies, political stability and tradition of treating the
foreign investor fairly.2 Brazil's long-standing policy of erecting
high tariff barriers to imports deemed similar to domestic manu-
factures has also been an important factor in attracting foreign
investment.'
1. As of September 30, 1982, the Central Bank had registered a total of $20,232,631,000
in direct foreign investment, including $6,053,803,000 in reinvestment. The actual amount of
direct foreign investment is substantially higher, however, because not all investment is reg-
istered with the Central Bank. See infra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text. The prin-
cipal countries of origin for this investment are the United States (31.3%), West Germany
(13.5%), Japan (9.3%), Switzerland (9.2%) and the United Kingdom (5.3%). The great
bulk of registered investment (73.3%) is in manufacturing, with service industries (20.8%)
accounting for most of the remainder.
The magnet is losing some of its drawing force. New foreign investment has fallen
steadily from a high of $2.5 billion in 1978 to $1.1 billion in 1982. The government has been
forced to scale down its original estimate of $1.5 billion in new foreign investment for 1983
to only $400 million. Jornal do Brasil, July 31, 1983, 1st cad., at 34, col. 5.
2. See Rosenn, Treatment of the Foreign Investor: The Brazilian Style, in THE FUTuRE
OF BRAzIL 245, 269-70 (W. Overholt ed. 1978).
3. This tariff policy, called the Law of Similars, is presently embodied in CACEX Coin-
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Brazil, however, has the largest external debt of any develop-
ing country, owing foreign creditors approximately $90 billion.4
Servicing this huge foreign debt currently consumes the great bulk
of the country's export earnings, producing an extremely serious
balance-of-payments crisis.' In January 1983, Brazil was forced to
suspend amortization payments on its foreign debt, to negotiate
bailout financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and to reschedule loans from major foreign banks."
Brazilians are understandably ambivalent about foreign in-
vestment. They resent having such a large part of their country's
industrialized sector in foreign hands7 and so much of its export
earnings consumed by foreign debt service.8 They are grimly aware
of the vulnerability of their economy to recessions in developed
munique No. 7 of Mar. 4, 1982, which is based on Decree-Law No. 37 of Nov. 18, 1966;
Decree No. 61.574 of Oct. 20, 1967; and Decree No. 64.017 of Jan. 22, 1969. It has induced
many manufacturers that had been exporting to Brazil to set up shop there. One important
study of American manufacturing investment in Brazil concluded that the "most powerful
specific inducement to manufacturing investment has been the Law of Similars." L. GORDON
& E. GoMMERS, UNITED STATES MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL 147 (1962). Not only
did the Law of Similars threaten foreign manufacturers with preclusion from the Brazilian
market, but it also assured them of a protected market if they set up operations in Brazil.
On December 7, 1979, President Figueiredo announced that the Law of Similars was being
relegated to the scrap heap as part of a package designed to restore a greater semblance of
free trade to the Brazilian scene. See Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business,
13 LAw AM. 169, 182 (1981). The Law of Similars has recently been revived as part of a new
economic strategy for dealing with the present balance-of-payments crisis. Bus. Lat. Am.,
Oct. 27, 1982, at 339.
4. The Central Bank reported $83.8 billion in foreign debt at the end of 1982. Jornal do
Brasil, Feb. 2, 1983, 1st cad., at 22, cola. 2-3. Private sources estimate that it is closer to $90
billion. Miami Herald, Feb. 19, 1983, at 15A, cola. 1-2; Ferreira de Oliveira, Saudades da
Inflacao de 100%, Jornal do Brasil, Feb. 5, 1983, 1st cad., at 11.
5. In 1981, Brazil spent $16.8 billion for interest and amortization of its foreign debt,
roughly 72 percent of its total export earnings. In 1982, debt service totalled approximately
$17.2 billion, roughly 85 percent of export earnings. Brazil had a current account deficit in
its balance-of-payments for 1982 of nearly $14.5 billion, in large part because of a decline of
more than 13 percent in exports. IMF SURVEY, Mar. 21, 1983, at 92-3. By cutting imports to
the bone and increasing exports by 15 percent, it hopes to cut this deficit to $6.9 billion for
1983. Bus. Lat. Am., Oct. 27, 1982, at 338.
6. On December 29, 1982, the Central Bank informed foreign creditor banks that prin-
cipal payments on medium- and long-term debt would not be remitted as of January 1983;
instead, such sums have been deposited in interest-bearing accounts with the Central Bank,
pending rollover as long-term debt. See Brazil Invents the Sambatorium, THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 8, 1983, at 73. See also in/ra note 52 and accompanying text.
7. Foreign firms dominate many of the dynamic sectors of the Brazilian economy, such
as the auto, electrical, machinery and pharmaceutical industries. For a recent breakdown of
ownership shares, see W. BAER, THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 179-81
(2d ed. 1983).
8. See supra note 5.
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countries. Because foreign firms have generally relied on capital-
intensive technology, foreign investment has tended to create a
well-paid elite class of skilled workers and managers but has done
little to provide employment opportunities for the great mass of
the population.' Most Brazilians acknowledge that foreign invest-
ment has played a vital role in promoting speedy economic growth.
Many blame this growth, however, for exacerbating the concentra-
tion of income, overly emphasizing production of luxury consumer
goods at the expense of basic necessities, and drastically increasing
foreign indebtedness and burgeoning social marginality."0 They are
also seriously concerned about the ability of Brazilian capital to
compete successfully with foreign capital. Ambivalence towards
foreign investment has been accentuated by Brazil's recent emer-
gence as an exporter of industrialized products and technology."'
After nearly two decades of authoritarian rule by the military,
which has assiduously courted foreign investment, Brazil is well
along the route to full restoration of democracy. Political prisoners
and exiles have been granted amnesty, censorship has been relaxed
and opposition candidates have recently assumed the governor-
ships of 10 out of 23 states, including the three important states of
S~o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. Denationalization of
Brazilian industry is a vital concern, and the proper role of foreign
investment is a highly controversial issue.1 2 In recent elections,
9. See W. BAER, supra note 7, at 191-92.
10. See Cardosa, Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Im-
plications, in AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL 142, 149 (A. Stepan ed. 1973); Evans & Gereffi, Foreign
Investment and Dependent Development, in BRAZIL AND MEXICO: PATERNS IN LAT DEvEL-
op E r 111, 112-13 (S. Hewlett & R. Weinert eds. 1982).
11. Between 1966 and 1980 Brazil exported technology worth approximately $3.2 bil-
lion, primarily to Third World Countries. INTa-AMsRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 142 (1982).
12. For example, at the end of 1980, a group of prominent Brazilians distributed a man-
ifesto bitterly criticizing Brazil's excessive tolerance of foreign investment and calling for the
country to regain control over its own destiny. Signers included a former state governor, a
former cabinet minister, the head of a large group of cement and mining companies, and
several generals. Bus. Lat. Am., Jan. 14, 1981, at 13-14. Elite attitudes towards foreign in-
vestment have been fairly well divided, but the issue is potentially explosive. See P. Mc-
DONOUGH, POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN BRAZIL 276-80 (1981). The recent election of Leonel
Brizola as governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro indicates that left wing nationalism re-
mains a potent political force that must be reckoned with. In 1959 and 1962, as Governor of
the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola expropriated subsidiaries of AFPCO and ITT with
no pretense of paying fair compensation. His actions created serious tensions between the
United States and Brazil and ultimately led to passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment.
See Rosenn, Expropriation in Argentina and Brazil: Theory and Practice, 15 VA. J. INT'L.
277, 303-04 (1975). To prevent any repetition of this embarrassment to the Federal Govern-
ment, Brazil enacted a decree-law that forbids the states and municipalities from expropri-
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several politicans campaigned on platforms of defaulting on the
foreign debt and closing the door to foreign investment. Even
under military rule, which has largely repressed nationalistic politi-
cal pressures to restrict foreign investors severely, the number of
economic areas from which foreign investors have been precluded
or forced to associate with local capital has steadily grown. Increas-
ing political liberalization is likely to accentuate present trends to-
ward increasing restrictions upon foreign investment.
The complex scheme by which Brazil attracts and regulates
foreign investment is a unique blend of stable basic rules and a
constantly changing series of regulations administered on an ad
hoc basis. Brazil continues to welcome foreign investment, confi-
dent that the country's size, resources and administrative sophisti-
cation enable it to control the large multinationals without sacrific-
ing national prerogatives or compromising national sovereignty.
Multinational corporations have managed to live quite well with
the Brazilian regulatory scheme, in part because of the tendency of
Brazilian officials to be reasonably flexible and pragmatic in ad-
ministering laws and regulations, and also because of the relative
liberality of the Brazilian scheme in comparison with more restric-
tive foreign investment legislation in other parts of Latin America.
Nevertheless, the legislation by which Brazil regulates foreign
investment is a hodgepodge of poorly conceptualized laws and de-
crees that make little economic sense. Not only does this hodge-
podge cause resources to be misallocated, but it also exacerbates
the country's bloated price structure by substantially increasing
transaction costs and restricting competition in the Brazilian mar-
ket. On the other hand, this regulator,' scheme represents an im-
portant political compromise between nationalists who urge more
severe restrictions upon foreign investment and internationalists
who seek to attract more foreign investment. Public re-examina-
tion of the basic assumptions and results of this regulatory scheme
has generally been avoided. As was once the case in Mexico,13 fear
that something much worse might replace the existing scheme has
tended to stifle serious criticism. Now that Brazil is undergoing a
ating shares or capital rights in institutions or firms whose functioning depends upon au-
thorization and inspection by the Federal Government, unless the President issues a decree
authorizing such expropriation. Decree-Law No. 856 of Sept. 11, 1969.
13. See H. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MExico: LAWS AND POLICIES 113 (1971);
Laughran & Foster, Foreign Investment in Mexico: The Emergency Decree of 1944, 39 TuL.
L. REv. 538 (1965).
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severe financial crisis, however, the need to attract more direct for-
eign investment and to avoid disinvestment of that already in
place suggests that a fresh critical examination of Brazil's foreign
investment regime is in order."'
This article has three purposes: (1) to describe the existing
conglomeration of laws, regulations and administrative practices
that constitute the scheme by which Brazil regulates foreign in-
vestment; (2) to analyze critically the strengths and weaknesses in
this regulatory scheme; (3) to suggest how it should be improved.
II. THE BASIC REGULATORY SCHEME
Unlike many developing nations, Brazil has never adopted a
comprehensive statute regulating foreign investment nor set up a
commission or agency to screen foreign investment. Foreign inves-
tors are generally free to invest directly in any kind of legitimate
venture in Brazil, but there are important exceptions.'5 Although
the establishment of a branch of a foreign company requires a
presidential decree, 6 no special permissions are required for for-
eign investors to organize a Brazilian company. Brazil regulates the
foreign investor through an amazingly flexible combination of
sticks and carrots. This combination includes exchange controls,
direct and indirect taxes, tariffs, price controls, transfer of technol-
ogy constraints, direct portfolio investment limitations, subsidized
financing and investment incentives.
Brazil's scheme for regulating foreign investment serves nu-
merous, if sometimes conflicting, purposes. These include: (1) con-
14. On January 7, 1983, the Brazilian government publicized a "Letter of Intention"
and a "Technical Memorandum of Understanding" with respect to a prospective $4.8 billion
loan from the IMF. This Letter of Intention stated that "the Brazilian authorities will at-
tempt to eliminate a number of exchange restrictions of minor impact, in an attempt to
facilitate international payments and transactions and to replace them, if necessary, with
measures that are not of an exchange nature." According to the Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, the minor exchange restrictions include limits on remittance of technical
assistance fees and royalties, as well as the supplemental tax on profit remittances. The then
President of the Central Bank, Carlos Langoni, explained that the government contemplates
a gradual reduction of the supplemental tax and the limitations on profit remittances, not
their sudden extinction. Jornal do Brasil, Jan. 8, 1983, 1st cad., cols. 2-3. Brazil failed to
comply with this Letter of Intention, which has been replaced by three subsequent Letters
of Intention.
15. See infra notes 146-70.
16. Decree-Law No. 2.627 of Sept. 26, 1940, arts. 59, 60 and 64. These articles, inter
alia, of the superseded 1940 Company Law remain in force in accordance with article 300 of
the 1976 Corporation Law, Law No. 6.404 of Dec. 15, 1976.
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trolling balance-of-payments, (2) encouraging exports, (3) discour-
aging imports, (4) channeling foreign investment into high priority
geographic areas, (5) preventing foreign capital from taking advan-
tage of Brazilian enterprise, (6) aiding enforcement of the tax laws,
(7) inducing foreign industries to set up operations in Brazil and
(8) stimulating development of national technology.
A. The Antecedents of Present Regulation of Foreign Investors
The political pressures that originally led to Brazilian regula-
tion of foreign investment stemmed from Brazilian nationalists'
deep-seated conviction that foreign investors were unfairly exploit-
ing Brazil's resources, siphoning off unconscionably high profits
and thereby contributing significantly to the country's chronic bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties. Consequently, the historic thrust of
Brazilian efforts to regulate foreign investment has been directed
at controlling the amounts that foreign investors can remit.
Brazil's initial effort to regulate foreign investment in a sys-
tematic fashion was a 1946 statute requiring registration of foreign
investment and loans with the Exchange Division of the Bank of
Brazil. 17 The amount of capital that could be repatriated in any
year was limited to 20 percent; remittances of dividends and inter-
est were restricted to 8 percent of registered capital. Any amounts
remitted in excess of 8 percent were treated as repatriations of
capital, effecting a pro tanto reduction in the registered capital
base. Like most Brazilian laws, however, this statute was not self-
executing. Not until six years later did the government issue the
regulations necessary for the implementation of the law.' 8 These
regulations sent shock waves through the foreign investment com-
munity, primarily because they failed to permit the addition of un-
remitted earnings and interest to registered capital in order to
build up the remittance base.1"
This regulatory scheme lasted less than a year. In 1953, the
great bulk of remittances of profits and interest, as well as repatri-
ation of capital, were freed from all restrictions. " Foreign exchange
17. Decree-Law No. 9.025 of Feb. 27, 1946, art. 6. Foreign capital invested in govern-
ment bonds or other fixed-income investments could be freely repatriated after two years.
18. Decree No. 30.363 of Jan. 3, 1952.
19. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, BRIT. CHAM. COMM., 34 MONTHLY BULL. BRIT. CHAM.
COMM. IN BRAZIL 124 (1952).
20. Law No. 1.807 of Jan. 7, 1953, as regulated by Decree No. 32.285 of Feb, 19, 1953.
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merely had to be purchased for such remittances at the free mar-
ket exchange rate. The only percentage restrictions retained were
for a special category of investments and loans deemed "of special
interest to the national economy. 21 These categories were allowed
to purchase foreign exchange for remittance of profits and interest
at a preferential rate.
In 1955, Brazil began to woo foreign investors aggressively
with an imaginative fiscal incentives program. The creation of an
automobile industry was assigned top priority. Auto manufacturers
were permitted to import used machinery at reduced tariff rates
and were granted subsidized financing. They were also permitted
to import component parts at reduced tariff rates, but only for a
limited time. By 1959, however, at least 70 percent of each vehi-
cle's total weight had to consist of nationally manufactured parts;
by 1961, local content had to comprise 90 percent. Similar pro-
grams were established to stimulate development of other indus-
tries, such as pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, textiles and shoes. As a
result, direct foreign investment in Brazil shot up from an annual
average of only $13.3 million in the 1947-1954 period to an annual
average of $102.4 million in the 1955-1961 period.22
Unrestricted freedom to repatriate capital and remit dividends
and interest continued from 1953 to 1962, when Brazil enacted a
highly controversial and poorly drafted Profit Remittance Law.28
The statute limited capital repatriation to 20 percent of registered
capital and yearly profit remittances to 10 percent. 4 Its regulatory
decree went well beyond the text of the law, denying remittance
rights to an open-ended category called "national capital."2 " The
most controversial provision of the decree was its refusal to permit
the addition of reinvested earnings to registered capital for the
21. Annual dividend remittances were limited to 10 percent of registered capital, and
loan interest was restricted to 8 percent of principal. Law No. 1.807 of Jan. 7, 1953, art. 6.
Such investments and loans had to be registered with the Superintendency of Money and
Credit (SUMOC). SUMOC was abolished in 1964 and replaced by the Central Bank. Law
No. 4.595 of Dec. 31, 1964, art. 8.
22. N. LEFF, EcoNoMic POLICY-MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL 1947-1964, 61
(1968).
23. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962.
24. Id., arts. 31-32. To the extent that interest on foreign loans exceeded interest rates
in the financial market where the loan originated, SUMOC was authorized to treat the ex-
cess as repatriation of capital. Id., art. 8.
25. "National Capital" was defined as foreign capital whose entry into Brazil could not
be duly proven. Decree No. 53.451 of Jan. 20, 1964, art. 9.
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purpose of determining the remittance base." The Profit Remit-
tance Law, coupled with several expropriations of foreign firms
and the chaotic economic conditions prevailing in the early 1960s,
reduced Brazil's foreign investment flow to a trickle.2 7
B. The Present Profit Remittance Law
Soon after the military seized power in April 1964, the Brazil-
ian Congress, purged of most left-wing nationalist elements, par-
tially defanged the Profit Remittance Law by eliminating the per-
centage limitations upon remittance of profits, repatriation of
capital, and loan interest."' Since 1964, foreign investors have been
free to repatriate all registered capital. They have also been al-
lowed to remit as much in profits as they wish, subject to a toll
charge in the form of a steep supplemental income tax on profit
remittances averaging more than 12 percent of registered capital a
year in any three-year period.2 ' Foreign loans must be approved by
the Central Bank, which monitors all interest payments to insure
that rates do not exceed the market."0
The most critical modification of the Profit Remittance Law
was allowing reinvested earnings to be added to the registered cap-
ital base for future remittance purposes. 31 Firms producing luxury
goods and services are theoretically barred from remitting divi-
dends in excess of 8 percent of registered capital per year.82 This
restriction has never been enforced; indeed, the meaning of "lux-
ury goods and services" has never been defined. In the event of a
serious balance-of-payments crisis, the statute authorizes the gov-
ernment temporarily to bar all capital repatriation, to restrict re-
mittance of dividends to 10 percent of registered capital per year
and to limit remittances of royalties and technical assistance fees
to 5 percent of the remittor's annual gross revenues.3 3 This provi-
26. Id., art. 31, sole paragraph.
27. See E. BURNS, NATIONALISM IN BRAZIL: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 100 (1968); Bergsman
& Candal, Industrialization: Past Success and Future Problems, in THE ECONOMY OF BRA-
ZuL 29, 50-52 (H. Ellis ed. 1969).
28. Law No. 4.390 of Aug. 29, 1964, as regulated by Dec. No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965.
29. This supplemental tax is discussed infra at notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
31. Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 10.
32. Law No. 4.390 of Aug. 29, 1964, art. 2; Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 11.
33. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 28; Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 49.
The statute specifically prohibits imposition of corresponding restrictions upon remitttance
of interest and principal of registered loans.
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sion has also never been invoked. Instead, Brazil has recently re-
sponded to its present balance-of-payments crunch by centralizing
sales of foreign exchange in the Central Bank, which has instituted
a rationing scheme. 4 The Central Bank has set out four priority
groups, none of which include royalties and dividend payments.
Firms are experiencing lengthy delays in obtaining foreign cur-
rency for such remittances.3 5
1. REGISTRATION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The key to the Brazilian regulatory scheme is registration with
the Central Bank. Unless a foreign investment is registered, the
investor cannot legally repatriate his investment or remit divi-
dends, although he is free to enjoy the fruits of his investment in
Brazil. With the exception of areas expressly declared off limits,
Brazilian law permits a foreign investor to register any investment
in the form of money or goods, such as machinery and equip-
ment,6 transferred to Brazil from abroad and utilized in economic
activity in Brazil. Only rarely, however, have Brazilian authorities
permitted direct registration of intangible property, such as pat-
ents, trademarks, know-how or software, as a foreign investment. 7
Royalties from registered technology transfer agreements, however,
may be capitalized and registered as a foreign investment as long
as a 25 percent withholding tax is paid.38
34. As of August 1, 1983, the great bulk of all sales of foreign exchange has been cen-
tralized in the Central Bank. Central Bank Res. No. 851 of July 29, 1983; Central Bank
Circular No. 804 of July 29, 1983.
35. Bus. Lat. Am., Oct. 12, 1983, at 321, 328.
36. As a practical matter, it is difficult to import machinery and equipment as a foreign
investment. Permission from the Central Bank and the Foreign Commerce Board of the
Bank of Brazil (CACEX) is required. The process is time-consuming, and permission will
normally be granted only if the machinery or equipment is destined for an industrial setting
or, to complement or modernize an already functioning firm. FIRCE Communique No. 32 of"
Aug. 23, 1978. Moreover, unlike a cash investment, which can be made through a holding
company, capital goods can be invested only for shares of the company that will actually use
them.
37. There is no formal legal obstacle to capitalizing technology. The reluctance of the
Central Bank to register such contributions as foreign investments appears to stem primar-
ily from uncertainty about the proper valuation of technology. Tozzini, Brazil: Technology
as Capital Contribution, 43 TAXES INT'L 11-12 (May 1983).
38. A. ANDRADE, 0 CAPrrAL ESTRANGEIRO NO SISTEMA JuRfoco BRASEIRO 93-94 (1979).
On certain occasions, the Central Bank has permitted indirect registration of technology
transferred to Brazil by re-characterizing the transaction as a sale of future royalties sym-
bolically remitted abroad and subsequently reinvested in Brazil. For example, Hydreco was
permitted to capitalize its technology by making a five-year sales forecast and projecting
royalties on the basis of rates received from European licensees. The standard 25 percent
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The registration certificate issued by the Central Bank is a
crucial document. It identifies the foreign investor, his country of
domicile or established place of business, the amount and currency
of the investment (or the value of the capital goods invested) and
the par value, class and number of the shares or quotas issued to
the foreign investor by the Brazilian enterprise in which the in-
vestment has been made. The Central Bank acts expeditously in
issuing a certificate of registration and normally does not act as a
screening agent. It will, however, make an effort to insure that the
value placed upon foreign investments made in the form of capital
goods is not inflated.39 The certificate may be transferred or as-
signed to another investor who purchases the underlying
investment.
The statute states that the investment is to be registered in
the currency of the country of origin. 0 This requirement has been
felicitously interpreted to mean that the investment will be regis-
tered in the currency in which the investment was actually made
rather than the currency of the investor's native country.41 Thus,
an Argentine investor can register his investment in dollars, francs
or marks rather than rapidly depreciating Argentine pesos. On the
other hand, the value of investments of capital goods will be regis-
tered in the currency of the country where the investor has his per-
manent establishment or domicile. This arbitrary rule precludes an
Argentine from investing in the form of capital goods or increases
transaction costs by forcing him to transfer these goods to a corpo-
ration domiciled in a country with a stable currency prior to in-
vesting in Brazil. Retained earnings that are eligible for reinvest-
ment are registered in the foreign currency in which the
investment has been registered at the average exchange rate be-
withholding tax on foreign remittances was then assessed upon the amount of this symbolic
sale, and the balance was registered as an investment. Bus. IN"'L CORP., A CORPORATE GUIDE
TO SOLVING OPERATING PROBLEMS IN BRAZIL 19-20 (1978). Since no income is actually gener-
ated by the transference of the industrial property rights, this tax must be paid from
capital.
39. Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 5, provides that the investment "shall be
registered at the price contained on its commercial invoice, attending to the regulatory for-
malities." CACEX tries to insure that the invoice price is realistic. CACEX also makes it
extremely difficult for foreign investors to include the cost of freight and insurance in the
invoice, even though article 5 of Decree No. 55.762 appears to permit registry of such costs.
A. ANDRADE, supra note 38, at 71.
40. Law No. 4 131 of Sept 3, 1962, art. 4.
41. Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 4. See Teixeira, Regime juridico fiscal dos
capitais estrangeiros no Brasil, 248 REv. FOR. 454, 458 (1974).
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tween the date of the balance sheet showing the earnings and the
date of the shareholders' meeting at which they were capitalized.'2
A substantial amount of foreign investment in Brazil has
never been registered with the Central Bank. Some estimates have
placed unregistered foreign investment as high as the amount of
registered investment, but that figure is probably too high.4 There
are seven common explanations for nonregistration of foreign in-
vestment in Brazil: (1) inability to demonstrate to the satisfaction
of the Central Bank the foreign origin of all or part of a pre-1962
investment, (2) purchase abroad of an existing investment for con-
sideration greater than the registration value, (3) failure to comply
with one or more of the technical conditions for effective registra-
tion, (4) refusal of the National Institute of Industrial Property
(INPI) and/or the Central Bank to register technology or indus-
trial property rights, (5) conversion of the foreign currency repre-
senting the investment into cruzeiros at the much more advanta-
geous black market rate, (6) the Central Bank's refusal to register
passive income stemming from interest or investments as reinvest-
ment or (7) appreciation in the real value of the net assets of the
Brazilian enterprise. Moreover, the registration system does not
permit revalorization to adjust for inflation occurring in the coun-
try in whose currency the investment is registered. This results in
substantial undervaluation of almost all registered investment."
2. REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN LOANS
Foreign currency loans must be authorized by, and registered
with, the Central Bank. Unless a loan is registered, interest and
principal payments may not be remitted abroad. In addition to
prior approval by the Central Bank, authorization from the Secre-
tariat of Control of State Enterprises (SEST) is required for any
public sector foreign borrowing, whether the borrower be the fed-
eral, state or municipal government, an autonomous governmental
42. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 4. See also A. ANDRADE, supra note 38, at 67-68.
The reinvestment is treated as though a remittance had been symbolically made and simul-
taneously reinvested in Brazil, but payment of the 25 percent withholding tax is not
required.
43. See Robock, Controlling Multinational Enterprises: The Brazilian Experience, J.
CONTEMPORARY Bus. 53, 56-58 (Aut. 1977), suggesting that the percentage of unregistered
foreign investment is falling, although it is still quite significant. See also Seixas, Brazil's
Law on Foreign Capital, 5 LAW. AM. 513, 516 (1973), estimating total foreign investment in
Brazil at $4 billion at a time when only $2.91 billion was registered.
44. See infra notes 208-11 and the accompanying text.
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agency, a public enterprise, or a company with mixed private and
public participation.45 Private sector foreign borrowings are essen-
tially unrestricted, although the Central Bank refuses to authorize
foreign loans if the borrower is an individual or if the proceeds will
be used to purchase Brazilian securities.
The Central Bank reviews loan applications to make sure that
the interest rate corresponds to rates prevailing in the market
where the loan originates and that the amortization schedule is not
disproportionately heavy in the early years. It carefully reviews the
spread above the prime rate or the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR). Interest and principal payments are permitted only in
quarterly, semi-annual or yearly installments. Within 30 days after
drawdown, the loan must be registered with the Central Bank.
Upon registration, the lender receives a registration certificate
specifying the currency, interest and principal payment terms of
the loan and identifying which party must pay the Brazilian with-
holding tax on interest payments.
The Central Bank has special rules for import financing. The
Foreign Commerce Board of the Bank of Brazil (CACEX) must
authorize import financing arrangements. Those which extend be-
yond two years need prior authorization and registration with the
Central Bank, as well as CACEX approval.46 Central Bank regis-
tration is contingent upon a ruling by CACEX that Brazilian firms
are unable to supply the imports.' The Central Bank and CACEX
also seek to ensure that prices paid for the goods financed by im-
port loans are not out-of-line with the prices of comparable goods
abroad. Payment of the amount financed, and the interest thereon,
may be made only upon presentation of a certificate of authoriza-
tion and the related schedule of payments issued by the Central
Bank. Prior to shipment of the goods, total payments to suppliers
for any non-financed amount may not exceed 20 percent of the im-
port value."8
45. Other approvals may also be needed. See generally Skola, Foreign Loans in Brazil:
Theory and Practice, 15 INT'L LAW. 73 (1981).
46. For machines and equipment with FOB value over $1,000,000, a minimum payment
period of eight years is required; for FOB values between $300,000 and $1,000,000, the mini-
mum payment period is five years; and for FOB values between $100,000 and $300,000, the
minimum payment period is three years. Spare parts for durable consumer goods have a
minimum payment period of one year, and all other products have a minimum payment
period of 180 days. Central Bank Res. No. 767 of Oct. 6, 1982, and Central Bank Circular
No. 737 of Oct. 6, 1982.
47. Central Bank Res. No. 355 of Dec. 2, 1975, art. IV.
48. FIRCE Communique No. 25 of Dec. 2, 1975, art. 4.
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The Central Bank divides foreign currency loans into three
basic categories: (1) Law 4.131 loans, (2) Resolution 63 loans and
(3) Resolution 355 loans. Law 4.131 loans are made directly to Bra-
zilian borrowers by foreign lenders. Resolution 63 loans are made
by foreign lenders to Brazilian financial institutions, which in turn
repass the loans to Brazilian borrowers in cruzeiros. Resolution 355
loans are primarily used for financing imports. The Central Bank
currently requires a minimum term of 8 years and an amortization
grace period of at least 30 months on all Law 4.131 and Resolution
63 loans. 9 As an anti-inflationary measure, the Central Bank re-
quires that 75 percent of the amount of all private sector foreign
loans entering the country be held on deposit, without interest,
with the Central Bank. One-third of this compulsory deposit is re-
leased in 60 days, another third is released in 90 days and the re-
mainder is released in 120 days.50 Upon presentation of the regis-
tration certificate and evidence that the withholding tax on foreign
remittances has been paid, the borrower is permitted to purchase
the necessary amounts of foreign currency to remit the interest or
principal payments due in accordance with the loan terms set out
in the registration certificate. A borrower may not legally remit any
interest to the lender in excess of the amount specified in the regis-
tration certificate without special Central Bank approval. Further,
income derived from reinvestment of such excess interest pay-
ments can neither be added to the registered principal nor legally
remitted from Brazil. Remittance of excess interest is treated as
the remittance of capital."1
As a result of the current balance-of-payments crisis, the Cen-
tral Bank has been holding principal repayments on most foreign
loans in accounts opened in the name of the foreign creditor and
denominated in the foreign currency borrowed." Interest pay-
49. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 173. These loan funds can, however, be reloaned to other
Brazilian borrowers for terms as short as 18 months. Central Bank Res. No. 229 of Sept. 1,
1972; Central Bank Circular No. 186 of Sept. 1, 1972.
50. Central Bank Res. No. 595 of Jan. 16, 1980.
51. Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 5.
52. Central Bank Res. No. 813 of Apr. 6, 1983; Central Bank Circular Nos. 769 and 770
of Apr. 6, 1983. Exceptions to the blocking of amortization remittances include; loans with a
term of less than 360 days; publicly issued bonds or floating rate notes; privately issued
securities; loans from foreign governments; international organizations or their agencies;
loans with at least 75 percent of their principal guaranteed or insured by foreign govern-
ments; obligations incurred in the financing of ships, aircraft or drilling rigs; banker's ac-
ceptances; and commercial paper. Sums in blocked accounts can be reloaned, however, to
Brazilian borrowers, provided that the minimum term is for eight years with a thirty-month
grace period on amortization payments.
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ments are still being remitted, but often with delays of several
months."
Foreign loans can be converted freely into registered capital
investment." Although the government has sought to encourage
such conversions, it has had little success. Its latest attempt is a
tax credit for Brazilian firms capitalizing principal or interest of
direct foreign currency loans or import financing prior to the end
of 1983.a'
C. Foreign Technology Transfers
Prior to 1958, licensing of technology and technical assistance
agreements was virtually unrestricted. Although it often took a
long time to register a patent, royalties could be freely remitted. In
the mid-1950s, the Brazilian Treasury became concerned about
substantial income escaping Brazilian taxation because of unrea-
sonably high deductions being claimed by subsidiaries of multina-
tionals as payments for patent and trademark royalties and techni-
cal assistance. In 1958, the income tax law was modified to limit
royalties for patents and payments for technical assistance to a
sliding scale (varying with the product classification) of 1 to 5 per-
cent of gross sales. Trademark royalties were limited to 1 percent
of gross sales if use did not derive from licensing of a patent, pro-
cess or formula."
This percentage limitation scheme on the deductibility of roy-
alties for tax purposes was later incorporated into the 1962 Profit
53. In its allocation of scarce foreign exchange, the Central Bank is giving priority to
interest payments on loans guaranteed by the National Treasury and on import financing.
See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
54. Decree No. 55.762 of Feb. 17, 1965, art. 50.
55. Decree-Law No. 1.994 of Dec. 29, 1982. The tax credit is 10 percent of the amount
of foreign indebtedness capitalized prior to June 30, 1983. The credit, which is to be applied
against the Brazilian company's income tax, was scheduled to fall to 5 percent for the bal-
ance of 1983, but Portaria No. 145 of the Finance Ministry, June 23, 1983, has extended the
10 percent credit through December 31, 1983.
56. Law No. 3.470 of Nov. 28, 1958, art. 74. Portaria No. 436, issued by the Finance
Ministry on Dec. 30, 1958, established product groupings for patent royalties. The permissi-
ble royalty deduction varied between a minimum of 1 percent and a maximum of 5 percent
of gross sales, depending upon in which group the patented product was placed. Deductions
for trademark royalties were limited to 1 percent of gross sales. Since 1975, INPI has been
refusing to approve technology agreements if royalties exceed these percentage limitations
as applied to net sales. Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, paras. 2.2.1 and 3.2.1. The
tax law was modified in 1979 to reflect the switch from gross to net sales as the basis for
royalty deductions. Decree-Law No. 1.730 of Dec. 17, 1979, art. 6.
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Remittance Law as a ceiling for profit remittance purposes. 57 Pay-
ments in excess of these percentages may still be made in
cruzeiros, but the payee may neither remit these amounts nor add
them to registered capital. Nor may the payor deduct them as a
business expense for income tax purposes. If the foreign licensor
directly or indirectly controls the Brazilian licensee, all royalty
payments for patents and trademarks are both nonremittable and
nondeductible for income tax purposes. Remittances for technical
assistance can still be made, but they are considered dividends and
charged against the 12 percent limit on registered capital5s
Since the creation of INPI in 1970,59 the procedures for ob-
taining payment for technology transferred to Brazil have become
increasingly Byzantine. Unless a technology transfer agreement has
been registered with INPI, the Central Bank will not authorize re-
mittances of royalties abroad, nor will the Finance Ministry permit
tax deductions for royalty or technical assistance payments. 0 Even
though INPI has issued a series of regulations, misleadingly la-
belled "normative acts,""1 that purport to set out guidelines indi-
cating which technology transfer agreements it will register, INPI
remains law unto itself. For example, even though no law or regu-
lation requires a Brazilian forum for dispute resolution, INPI will
usually refuse to approve an agreement with a clause requiring ar-
bitration or litigation in some place other than Brazil. Instead,
INPI insists upon dispute resolution through litigation before Bra-
zilian courts or arbitration in Brazil in accordance with the Brazil-
ian Code of Civil Procedure. Recent attempts to challenge INPI's
virtually unfettered discretion in the courts have thus far proven
unsuccessful.0
2
INPI has broken down technology transfers into five catego-
ries: (1) patent licenses, (2) trademark licenses, (3) know-how li-
censes, (4) technical-industrial cooperation agreements and (5)
specialized technical service agreements. If an agreement covers
57. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, arts. 12-13.
58. Id., arts. 13-14.
59. Law No. 5.648 of Dec. 11, 1970.
60. FIRCE Communique No. 19 of Feb. 16, 1972.
61. The most important are Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, which contains
detailed rules concerning the registration and approval of technology transfer agreements,
and Normative Act No. 32 of May 5, 1978, which requires prior consultation.
62. Decision of the 1st Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 27, 1979, and Decision of
the 7th Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro, Mar. 19, 1980. These cases are reported in detail in
3 L. ECKSTRoM, LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 29-231 to-245 (rev. ed.
1983).
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more than one category, it must be broken down into separate con-
tracts for each category.68 Agreements that do not fall readily into
any of these five categories must be submitted to INPI for
orientation."4
1. PATENT LICENSING
The actions and inactions of INPI, coupled with several
changes in Brazilian law, have made patent licensing so onerous,
time-consuming and unpredictable that many patent holders have
been dissuaded from licensing their patents in Brazil. Royalties
can be collected only while the Brazilian patent is in force and ac-
tually being used. Theoretically, one can license a Brazilian patent
for its entire life of 15 years (10 years for an industrial design or
model).6 5 INPI, nevertheless, flatly refuses to.register certain types
of patents, such as product or process patents on drugs, food or
medicine. If a patent has a shorter life in its country of origin,
INPI will limit the Brazilian patent to that shorter life." Prior to
1971, when the present Code of Industrial Property was adopted,
Brazil computed the term of a patent from the date of issuance.
Since 1971, Brazil has computed the term from the date of applica-
tion for the Brazilian patent. Because INPI processes patent appli-
cations with the speed of a tired tortoise (in 1980 it had a backlog
of nine years),67 the useful life of a Brazilian patent is far less than
the statutory term.
INPI has sharply curtailed the freedom of foreign licensors
and domestic licensees to contract. A patent licensor must grant
the licensee ownership of all improvements made by him and fur-
nish him with detailed information on all improvements made by
the licensor. The license may not contain any tie-in provisions, nor
may it limit output, price or export of the product. In certain cir-
cumstances, territorial exclusivity might pass muster, but such
63. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept., 11, 1975, para. 1.1.1.
64. Id., art. II.
65. Industrial Property Code, Law No. 5.772 of Dec. 21, 1971, art. 24.
66. Nattier, Limitations on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, 11 INT'L LAW.
437, 443-44 (1977).
67. Gazeta Mercantil, May 17, 1980. A study of 78 inventions, covering three technical
fields, for which patent applications were filed in both Brazil and the United States between
1961 and 1975 revealed that only 5 percent of the Brazilian applications were granted (after
an average pendency of 71/2 years), while the United States granted 85 percent of the appli-
cations. Pegan, Technology Exchange in Brazil, 4 THE LAW AND BUSINESS ow LICENSING,
520.195, 520.198 (M. Finnegan & R. Goldscheider eds., 1980 rev.).
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provisions are generally disapproved. The licensor cannot prohibit
free use of data and technical information after the expiration of
the patent, nor can he limit research by the licensee.68 Contrary to
accepted international licensing practice, the licensor may only
charge for the basic engineering package delivered at the start of a
licensing operation as an advance against royalties.69 Since 1975,
royalties must be calculated as a percentage of net rather than
gross sales,70 a sharp break with the prior practice under the in-
come tax and profit remittance legislation. "Net sales" is defined
as the invoice value less taxes, returns, discounts, freight, packag-
ing, insurance, and the cost of imported components purchased
from the licensor or third parties related to the licensor. This pecu-
liar definition reduces remittable royalties even further.71 The
combination of these restrictions has made patent licensing a de-
cidedly unattractive way to conduct business in Brazil.
2. TRADEMARK LICENSING
The restrictions on trademark licensing generally parallel
those imposed on patent licensing. No royalty payments may be
made if a foreign licensor directly or indirectly controls a majority
of the licensee's shares. 72 Royalties for a trademark license can
only be paid after the mark has been registered in Brazil and then
only during the initial ten-year term; no royalties can be paid dur-
ing a renewal period.78 No royalties can be paid if the deposit is
made in Brazil without proof of priority in the country of origin.7"
Moreover, INPI has recently taken the position that Brazilian
trademark licensees cannot pay any royalties to foreigners on
marks that constitute simple variations on the subject matter of
previous registrations or applications.7 Unlike patent licensors,
trademark licensors may not charge royalties greater than one per-
cent of net sales.7 6
68. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, pays. 2.5.2(b)(iii).
69. Nattier, supra note 66, at 445-46. The amount of the advance is calculated as a
percentage of the sales price. Id.
70. See supra note 56.
71. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, para. 2.2.1.
72. Id. at para. 3.2.4(a).
73. Id. at para. 3.2.4(c).
74. Id. at para. 3.2.4(b).
75. INPI, Normative Act No. 61 of Mar. 24, 1982.
76. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, para. 3.2.1, coupled with Portaria
No. 436 of the Finance Ministry, Dec. 30, 1958.
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Every trademark licensing agreement must contain a clause
giving the licensee the option of using his own trademark in con-
junction with the licensor's mark on products covered by the
agreement, as well as the right to use only his own mark on items
not licensed under the agreement." INPI requires requires this op-
tion so that after termination of the license, the licensee can more
readily compete with the licensor for customers developed by the
licensee.7 8
3. KNOW-HOW LICENSING
Many agreements that begin as patent licenses are ultimately
recharacterized as agreements for the transfer of unpatented tech-
nology or know-how. Registration with INPI of an agreement
transferring know-how is also onerous and time-consuming, but
the parties need not wait for years for INPI to register a patent.
The parties must satisfy INPI that the technology is unavailable
domestically and that its transfer to a Brazilian licensee (1) is in
line with national developmental priorities; (2) will bring short-
term real advantages for the development of the industrial sector;
(3) will improve the quality of the product's manufacture, princi-
pally with respect to exports; (4) will allow the substitution of im-
ports of the product; and (5) will allow the licensee to absorb and
master the technology within the life of the agreement.79 The licen-
sor must supply INPI with all technical data and engineering
drawings, as well as all information necessary to update the know-
how. Moreover, the licensor must guarantee that it will not patent
the know-how at some future date. A secrecy clause, which is criti-
cal with unpatented technology in Brazil,80 is permissible only if
INPI deems it reasonable under the circumstances. 8'
77. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, para. 3.5.1(c).
78. Daniel, Trademark Policy in Brazil under the Second Basic Plan for Scientific and
Technological Development, 66 TRADEMARK RRP. 173, 176 (1976).
79. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, paras., 4.1.2 and 4.2(h).
80. Brazil regards unpatented know-how as part of the public domain, freely exploita-
ble by anyone. INPI, Normative Act No. 17 of May 11, 1976, arts. 15.5 and 15.5.1. Brazil
lacks any body of law that adequately protects against unauthorized use of know-how.
Radway, Antitrust, Technology Transfers and Joint Ventures in Latin American Develop-
ment, 15 LAw. AM. 47, 61-62 (1983).
81. INPI, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, para. 4.5.2(d)(vi).
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4. TECHNICAL-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Technical-industrial cooperation agreements are designed to
permit the Brazilian contractor to acquire the knowledge, tech-
niques and services needed to set up plants and to manufacture
specialized machinery, equipment and component parts. The
agreement may not refer, even implicitly, to any industrial prop-
erty rights. To register a technical-industrial cooperation agree-
ment, one must satisfy INPI that the services to be rendered will:
(1) involve technical levels unavailable locally; (2) produce short-
term benefits to the sector consistent with national policy objec-
tives for industrial technology and development; (3) produce a
quality product, with export possibilities given particular consider-
ation; and (4) permit substitution of imports.8 2 The supplier of the
services may be compensated either on a cost plus basis or a roy-
alty linked to net sales, but INPI must be satisfied that the com-
pensation arrangements are reasonable and that any foreign tech-
nicians will not remain in Brazil longer than necessary. Generally,
the term of technical assistance agreements cannot exceed five
years, even between unrelated parties. If convinced that technolog-
ical innovations require a greater period, INPI may permit exten-
sion of the agreement for up to five more years, but no advance
assurance is available with respect to this possibility. In the event
that INPI permits an extension, the supplier's remuneration is to
be reduced to permit greater use of domestic enginering services.88
In no case, however, may a technical-industrial cooperation agree-
ment exceed ten years."4
5. SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL SERVICES
Specialized technical services agreements are designed to pro-
vide Brazilian companies with specialized services of foreign tech-
nicians, primarily for planning, feasibility and start up services. To
register a specialized technical services agreement, one first has to
satisfy INPI that needed technical services are not available do-
mestically. The agreement must insure that the Brazilian company
receives complementary technical information and assistance, that
the services rendered will be sufficient to achieve the aims of the
82. Id., para. 5.1.2.
83. Id. at para. 5.4.2.
84. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 12(3).
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agreement, that no industrial property rights will be asserted with
respect to the transferred technology and that no restriction will
be imposed on the full use of information and data received.8
INPI must approve a detailed schedule for each foreign technician
of the services to be rendered, an estimate of the time his services
will be needed, and his compensation. Engineering services can be
imported only through a Brazilian engineering company unless the
importing firm demonstrates that it has the necessary technicians
to enable it to absorb the imported technology.86
INPI has developed special rules to prevent its foreign-owned
automobile industry from paying indirect technical assistance costs
to parent companies. Since 1978, INPI has prohibited foreign auto
manufacturers from charging their Brazilian subsidiaries for: (1)
administrative, financial and marketing services; (2) salaries, travel
or transfer expenses of foreign personnel assigned to activities not
specifically linked to specific and temporary technical services; or
(3) research and development performed by the parent company.
Nor can payments be made for any plans of new models and man-
ufacturing methods developed abroad, with the exception of plans
for engines and mechanical components beyond the technological
levels currently attained in Brazil.8 7 One can expect INPI gradu-
ally to extend this approach to other industries as Brazil makes a
concerted effort to sever its foreign technology umbilical cord.
6. PRIOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURE
In 1978, INPI added an additional layer to the time-consum-
ing process of securing its approval by requiring that virtually all
technology agreements be submitted to it twice: first for prelimi-
nary approval, and later for final approval.88 Parties to technology
transfer agreements, with the exception of technical services of an
occasional nature involving less than $20,000 or the inspection or
assembly of imported equipment, must submit a draft of the pro-
posed agreement. This draft must contain a Portuguese translation
in parallel columns to the language chosen by the foreign party.
The draft must show the ownership of the Brazilian company, any
85. INPI, Normative Act No. 60 of Apr. 13, 1982, paras. 2.1 and 7.
86. Id., at para. 3.
87. INPI, Normative Act No. 30 of Jan. 19, 1978, as amended by Normative Act No. 60
of Apr. 13, 1982.
88. INPI, Normative Act No. 32 of May 5, 1978.
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relationships between the parties, the need to import the technol-
ogy, the exact terms of the compensation agreed upon, alternative
sources of the technology (either in Brazil or abroad) and the rea-
son for choosing this particular technology supplier.
During this prior consultation process, INPI not only scruti-
nizes the language of the agreement, but also verifies the status of
patents and trademarks and evaluates the sophistication of the
technology. Agreements involving technology deemed to be unso-
phisticated or already available in Brazil will be disapproved, even
if the technology is available only to the proposed licensee's com-
petitor. In addition, all existing or contemplated technology agree-
ments between the parties must be submitted regardless of
whether approval has already been granted or is unnecessary. Os-
tensibly designed to expedite the process of securing approval of
technology transfers, compulsory preliminary approval has a ten-
dency to slow the process down. INPI approval must be secured
twice, and prior approval does not prevent INPI from refusing
final approval. This dual approval procedure is designed to permit
INPI to take an even more active role in making itself a party to
the negotiations by insisting upon changes in the language and
terms of the agreement.
7. MANDATORY INVESTMENT-NORMATIVE ACT NO. 64
In September 1983, INPI promulgated Normative Act No. 64,
which imposes additional costs on those seeking approval of tech-
nology transfer agreements. Whenever it decides that Brazil should
develop domestically the kind of technology that is the subject of a
proposed technology transfer agreement, INPI intends to condition
approval of the proposed agreement on the Brazilian contractor's
assumption of a formal commitment to invest in research and de-
velopment of similar technology. The amount of the investment
will vary in accordance with financial situation of the Brazilian
contractor and the amount being paid for the imported technology.
The investment can be made either in a Brazilian research insti-
tute or in the Brazilian contractor itself.89
An additional requirement has been imposed whenever a for-
eign-controlled Brazilian company seeks to purchase technology
from an unrelated foreign company. As a condition to approving
89. INPI, Normative Act No. 64 of Sept. 16, 1983, paras. 1.1 and 1.2.
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such an agreement, INPI now insists that the parent company
make an equity investment in its Brazilian subsidiary in an
amount equal to the remittances that the subsidiary is obligated to
pay for the technology. This investment has to be made prior to
each respective remittance.90
These new, mandatory investment requirements will obviously
discourage certain technology transfers by making the imported
technology much more expensive. Brazilian companies must not
only pay royalties or fees, but they must also pay for research and
development expenses of the imported technology. Foreign parent
companies will be forced to tie up capital in Brazil anytime their
Brazilian subsidiaries need to purchase foreign technology from
unrelated companies. Depending on how INPI administers these
requirements, Normative Act No. 64 may lead to much reinvention
of the wheel.
Despite its prior consultation procedure and the guidelines
contained in its numerous normative acts, INPI is both unpredict-
able and dilatory. In recent years, it has been following a fairly
restrictive policy because of Brazil's serious balance-of-payments
problems. In 1979, INPI refused to approve about 36 percent of
the applications it considered, a substantial increase from its 7 to
10 percent application refusal rate of the three prior years.9 1 These
figures are somewhat misleading because they do not reflect the
much larger number of agreements that had to be modified sub-
stantially to secure INPI approval.
D. Foreign Trade
The foreign exchange rate, imports and exports are all tightly
controlled, providing additional techniques through which the Bra-
zilian government controls foreign investors. Since 1968, the cru-
zeiro has been on a "trotting peg," subject to frequent mini-deval-
uations of 1 to 3 percent every few weeks (every few days thus far
in 1983). In theory, these devaluations were to have been calcu-
90. Id., para. 2.
91. Jornal do Com6rcio, May 7, 1980, at 6. Of the agreements approved by INPI, 80
percent were in the areas of petroleum and petro-chemicals, nuclear and electric energy,
capital goods, steel, and nonmetallic materials. The great bulk of the approved agreements
were for engineering services. Id. Between 1972 and 1978, INPI approved 78.5 percent
(9,764 out of 12,434) of the requests submitted to it. FUNDACAO CAsA DE Rui BA JBOSA,
TRANSPERINCIA DR TECNOLOGIA-JURISPRUD2NCIA JUDICIAL E ADMINISTRATIVA 43 (A. Bastes,
Coord. 1981).
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lated to adjust for the differential between Brazil's inflation rate
and those of its major trading partners, but in practice, the rate of
cruzeiro devaluation prior to 1983 was allowed to lag behind this
inflation differential. From time to time, a maxi-devaluation was
required to offset over-valuation of the cruzeiro. A chronically
overvalued cruzeiro has made initial foreign investment more ex-
pensive but has increased the value of earnings and reinvestment.
Brazil's initial agreement with the IMF called for the cruzeiro to
be devalued at an average monthly rate at least 1 percent greater
than the domestic inflation rate. After the 30 percent maxi-devalu-
ation in February 1983, Brazil began pegging the exchange rate to
its domestic inflation rate." In September 1983, Brazil began link-
ing the exchange rate to the expurgated version of the consumer
price index,"s which once again sets the cruzeiro on the path to
overvaluation."
Imports require licenses from CACEX and are subject to sub-
stantial taxes and duties. The rates of duty vary between 0 and 205
percent ad valorem, with most products falling in the 30 to 85 per-
cent range. Prior to December 1979, imports were not only subject
to duty, but to a prior deposit in cruzeiros equal to the value of the
import. This cruzeiro sum had to remain on deposit for one year
without monetary correction or interest; with an inflation rate of
roughly 100 percent, this scheme effectively doubled the price of
imports. Exports were encouraged by exemptions from the Tax on
the Circulation of Merchandise (ICM), credits against the Tax on
Industrialized Products (IPI) and income tax exemption on profits
from export sales. In December 1979, both the prior deposit and
the IPI tax credit for exports were eliminated. For a time, the eco-
nomic effects of these changes were offset by a 30 percent maxi-
devaluation."
During the early part of 1980, CACEX began an informal pol-
icy of limiting imports of capital goods for a firm's own use to the
value of the firm's imports in the previous year. Imports for resale
were also limited to 80 percent of the previous year's imports. For-
92. Central Bank Res. No. 802 of Mar. 10, 1983.
93. Jornal do Brasil, Sept. 9, 1983, 1st cad., at 14, col. 5.
94. The index is being expurgated by removing wheat, petroleum and agricultural com-
modities affected adversely by climatic calamaties. For an idea of the differential between
the unexpurgated and expurgated versions of the index, see note 196 infra.
95. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 190. The IPI credit scheme was revived again by Portaria
No. 78 of April 1, 1981, of the Finance Ministry. Portaria No. 252 of Nov. 29, 1982, extended
the IPI credit at the rate of 11 percent until April 30, 1985.
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eign-controlled firms were told either to import capital goods for
their own use without exchange cover, thereby characterizing their
imports as equity investments, or to arrange external financing for
at least five years. Even Brazilian-controlled firms were told to ar-
range a minimum of five years external financing, although if such
financing proved to be unobtainable, CACEX would consider waiv-
ing this requirement. Cash sales were not prohibited, but CACEX
considered them "undesirable." Machinery components, whether
imported by foreign or locally controlled firms, were required to
have a minimum of two years' foreign financing and could be im-
ported only for projects granted export incentives."
In September 1980, CACEX's informal policy of constraining
imports was codified in a Central Bank resolution that established
a sliding scale of minimum external financing terms for imports,
ranging from 3 years for those machines, equipment, instruments,
vehicles, ships and airplanes with an FOB value of $100,000 to
$300,000 and up to eight years for goods with values in excess of $5
million. A two-year minimum financing period was imposed on im-
ports of spare parts when the import license was issued prior to
December 31, 1980, and a one-year period was required on licenses
issued thereafter. Durable consumer goods and raw and intermedi-
ate materials for the steel and chemical industries were required to
have a minimum term of 180 days financing if the invoice amount
were in excess of $100,000. 9" At the end of 1980, the Tax on Finan-
cial Transactions (IOF) was increased from 15 to 25 percent.8 This
tax is imposed upon the purchase of foreign exchange, which ap-
plies to a little over half of all imports, making the cost of these
imports even more expensive. In September 1982, CACEX added
more than 1,000 items to a list of goods for which it will not issue
import licenses." In October 1982, the Central Bank reduced the
value of imports requiring a minimum external financing term of
eight years from $5 million to $1 million.0 0
Since August 1, 1983, when Brazil was forced to institute the
rationing of foreign exchange, the Central Bank has become an ad-
ditional screening agent for imports. If the Central Bank assigns a
96. Bus. Lat. Am., Sept. 15, 1982, at 190-91.
97. Central Bank Res. No. 638 of Sept. 24, 1980, as modified by Central Bank Circular
No. 574 of October 27, 1980.
98. Decree-Law No. 1.844 of Dec. 30, 1980.
99. CACEX Communique 26, published in the Diirio Oficial on Sept. 28, 1982.
100. See supra note 46.
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low priority to an import, the importer may have to wait indefi-
nitely to secure the necessary foreign exchange from the Central
Bank or pay a much higher price by resorting to the black market.
This rationing scheme substantially increases the transaction costs
of importing goods into Brazil. The importer must buy foreign cur-
rency from a commercial bank to pay for the imported goods, but
he has no idea as to when the Central Bank will remit the foreign
currency to the exporter. Hence, the importer does not know when
the merchandise will be shipped and how much it will eventually
cost. This rationing measure should bolster the government's goal
of reducing public sector imports by 29 percent and private sector
imports by 22 percent in 1983.
Until recently, goods could be freely exported from Brazil with
few exceptions. In the wake of the February 1983 maxi-devalua-
tion, Brazil temporarily imposed export taxes of 10 to 20 percent
on a number of commodity exports,01 supposedly to prevent im-
porters from receiving the benefit of the devaluation. This ill-con-
sidered measure nullifies the major reason for the devaluation:
stimulation of exports.
Exporting from Brazil is still difficult, despite the govern-
ment's avowed desire to stimulate exports as much as possible. A
non-transferable export license must be obtained from CACEX for
all products except coffee, whose exportation is subject to special
rules under the authority of the Brazilian Coffee Institute. Even
after recent attempts to streamline the process, securing an export
license can still involve as many as 1,470 separate legal actions
before 13 government ministries and 50 agencies.'0 2 CACEX con-
trols the prices at which goods can be exported by publishing mini-
mum export prices. At the time it issues the license, CACEX must
approve the firm's expenses for freight, insurance and agent's com-
mission. Generally, CACEX will not permit the payment of a com-
mission to a parent or affiliated company if the company has re-
ceived investment incentives in return for a commitment to export.
If Brazil were really serious about promoting exports, abolition of
the export license scheme would be the most logical reform.
101. Central Bank Res. Nos. 799 of Feb. 18, 1983, and 800 of Feb. 22, 1983.
102. Freed, Brazil Bureau Is Battling Bureaucracy, Miami Herald, May 15, 1981, at 9c,
cols. 3-6.
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E. Income Taxation
Another way Brazil controls foreign investment is through in-
come tax laws. Brazil's basic corporate income tax rate is now 35
percent.""8 Brazil also has an excess profits tax of 10 percent on all
income in excess of 40,000 ORTNs (about US $306,900 at the start
of December 1983).104 Capital gains and losses are treated as ordi-
nary income and losses. Generally, ordinary and necessary business
expenses are deductible. One significant exception is that no roy-
alty or technical assistance payments, made by a Brazilian com-
pany to a related foreign company, may be deducted. 0 5 A second
exception is that no royalty or technical assistance, even if paid in
Brazil in cruzeiros, may be deducted as a legitimate business ex-
pense unless the agreement has been approved by INPI. The Bra-
zilian Treasury has continued to adhere to this position despite a
decision of the Federal Appellate Tribunal sustaining a taxpayer's
challenge of this regulation on the theory that no law exists to sup-
port the tax authorities' interpretation.'"
In the absence of a tax treaty, Brazil also levies a 25 percent
income withholding tax on all dividend, interest, rental, royalty
and technical assistance payments made to nonresident individuals
and corporations.107 Tax treaties in force with more than a dozen
countries usually reduce this tax rate to 15 percent (12.5 percent
for Japan).108 Foreign loan agreements commonly shift the burden
of paying this tax to the Brazilian borrower. When this is done, the
effective withholding tax rate becomes 331/3 percent because the
payment of the tax on the lender's behalf is treated as the
equivalent of remittance of the amount of the tax to the lender."
In 1975, the Central Bank decided to reduce the effective cost of
103. Decree-Law No. 2.065 of Oct. 26, 1983, art. 16.
104. Id., art. 15(11).
105. Brazilian Income Tax Reg., Decree No. 85.450 of Dec. 4, 1980, arts. 232 (IV, V &
VI) and 234 § 2 [hereinafter cited as Income Tax Reg.].
106. Pirelli S/A Cia. Ind(stria Brasileira v. UniAo, REO 81.966, Dec. 14, 1979, Difrio da
Justiva, Mar. 5, 1980, at 1092. The Treasury's position was set out first in Normative Opin-
ion No. 102 of 1975 of the Coordinator of the Tax System.
107. Income Tax Reg., art. 555.
108. Brazil currently has tax treaties in effect with Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
West Germany. For discussion of some of these treaties, see A. XAVIER, THE TAXATIoN OF
FOREIGN INVESTMTrr IN BRAZIL 86-99 (1980); Gouvea Vieira, Brazil, in TAx INCENTIVES FOR
PIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 187, 201-03 (R. Anthoine ed. 1979).
109. Income Tax Reg., art. 577; J. BULHOES PEDREIRA, IMPOSrO DE RENDA 18-11 and 18-
12 (1969).
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foreign loans with minimum terms of 8 years by rebating 85 per-
cent of the tax withheld to the Brazilian borrower. Once set as high
as 95 percent, the rebate is presently 40 percent,"' primarily be-
cause of complaints by U.S. banks that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's disallowance of the foreign tax credit with respect to that
portion of the tax subject to rebate"' placed them at a competitive
disadvantage.
A foreign investor may opt to reinvest earnings in the enter-
prise in which his investment is registered rather than remit them
abroad. So long as the earnings are reinvested in the same enter-
prise, the investor need not pay the 25 percent withholding tax. If,
however, a foreign investor reinvests part of these earnings in an-
other enterprise, the withholding tax must be paid.'
Earnings of Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign corporations rein-
vested in the enterprise in which they are earned remain exempt
from the 25 percent withholding tax unless repatriated within 5
years after capitalization." 8 Income earned by a Brazilian branch
of a foreign corporation is immediately subject to the 25 percent
withholding tax regardless of when the income is remitted to the
parent. Such income is classified as an automatic dividend by in-
voking the legal fiction that it is immediately available to the par-
ent."' If a branch uses retained income for plant expansion, the
withholding tax rate drops to 15 percent." 5
In 1975, the 25 percent withholding tax was reduced to 15 per-
cent on distributions to foreign investors by investment companies
authorized by the Central Bank to channel foreign investment into
Brazil's capital market."' If the investment capital entered Brazil
prior to December 29, 1982, and has remained in the country for at
least 6 years, the tax rate on distributions falls to 12 percent, and,
after 8 years, the rate falls to 8 percent.17 Portfolio investment
110. Central Bank Res. No. 613 of May 8, 1980.
111. U.S. Rev. Rul. 78-258, 1978-1 C.B. 239.
112. In certain circumstances the Central Bank will permit tax-free reinvestment of
dividends received from a different enterprise, provided the payor belongs to the same eco-
nomic group as the recipient.
113. Decree-Law No. 1.598 of Dec. 26, 1977, art. 63; Normative Opinion of the Coordi-
nator of the Tax System No. 99 of Feb. 12, 1971, para. 3.
114. Income Tax Reg., art. 555 § 9; Normative Opinion of the Coordinator of the Tax
System No. 5 of Mar. 6, 1974. See also A. XAVIEa, supra note 108, at 50.
115. Income Tax Reg., art. 555(III)(a).
116. Decree-Law No. 1.401 of May 7, 1975, art. 2.
117. Id. art. 5, as amended by Decree-Law No. 1.986 of Dec. 28, 1982.
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entering Brazil subsequent to December 29, 1982, however, is
taxed at a flat 15 percent rate on profit remittances regardless of
how long it remains, but capital gains on such investment are ex-
empt from withholding tax.'
An integral part of Brazil's regulatory scheme for foreign in-
vestment is a supplemental income tax on excess profit remit-
tances. Foreign investors are free to remit all distributable earn-
ings, but net dividend remittances (after deducting the normal 25
percent withholding tax) in excess of 12 percent per year of regis-
tered capital, are subjected to a progressive surtax. The tax rate is
40 percent on net remittances between 12 and 15 percent of regis-
tered capital; 50 percent on net remittances between 15 and 25
percent; and 60 percent on net remittances in excess of 25 per-
cent."1' This supplemental tax is calculated upon a three-year mov-
ing average, so that a remittance of more than 12 percent of regis-
tered capital in any single year will not necessarily trigger the
supplemental levy if there is sufficient slack in remittances in the
other two years in the triennium to absorb the excess.120 These
supplemental tax rates are not reduced in any of Brazil's tax trea-
ties, but they may be creditable against the foreign investor's in-
come tax in his home country.121 In a recent to make foreign in-
vestments in the Brazilian stock market more attractive,
remittances of cash dividends and bonuses to foreign investors
from Decree-Law 1.401 investment companies have been exempted
from the supplemental tax.' 22
Few firms actually pay this supplemental tax. Since they are
118. Decree-Law No. 1.986 of Dec. 28, 1982, art. 5.
119. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 43 § 1; Income Tax Reg., art. 559 § 1.
120. Income Tax Reg., art. 559 § 7. Calculation of the supplemental tax can be compli-
cated, for typically one's registered capital changes from year to year, and the lst two years
of one period are the first two years of the next triennium. In other words, if the first trien-
nium includes the years 1978, 1979 and 1980, the second triennium will be 1979, 1980 and
1981. Until recently, any supplementary tax withheld was inexplicably treated as remitted
profit for the purpose of calculating whether supplemental tax was owed for the next trien-
nium. Normative Opinion No. 77 of the Coordinator of the Tax System, Sept. 4, 1978, para.
10. This illogical interpretation was rectified in 1982. Currently, any supplemental tax paid
is eliminated from remitted profits so that foreign investors are no longer taxed on taxes.
Normative Opinion No. 49 of the Coordinator of the Tax System, July 14, 1982. For an
explanation of some of the complexities in calculating the supplementary tax, see A. XAvER,
supra note 108, at 78-86.
121. The U.S. Treasury permits a foreign tax credit for payment of this supplemental
tax. Rev. Rul. 68-310, 1968-1 C.B. 342.
122. Decree-Law No. 1.986 of Dec. 28, 1982. Capital gains from these investment com-
panies can now be remitted free from both withholding and supplemental tax. Id.
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already subject to a 25 percent withholding tax on all dividend re-
mittances, investors incur no supplemental tax liability unless they
distribute more than 16 percent per annum on registered capital.
This is a far greater rate of return than foreign firms have been
averaging in Brazil.128 Indeed, it is doubtful whether this supple-
mental tax makes any economic sense. In a period of economic
boom, some firms may wish to remit higher profits, but that is
when Brazil can afford to allow them to do so. During hard times,
most firms have few profits to remit. At the present time, foreign
firms have had to rely heavily on internal funding due to high rates
of inflation and extremely limited access to domestic financing
sources.
Capital repatriation is not subject to tax. If, however, an inves-
tor sells his investment in Brazil at a price greater than the regis-
tered capital, the capital gain will be treated as if it were a divi-
dend, and it will be subjected to the 25 percent withholding tax
and the supplemental tax. 2"
Brazil offers such a vast array of tax incentives that it is diffi-
cult to estimate the effective tax rate on foreign firms doing busi-
ness in Brazil. Some of these incentives take the form of deduc-
tions, while others are tax credits. The principal tax incentives are
discussed below in the more general context of investment
incentives.
F. Investment Incentives
Another important technique Brazil uses to regulate foreign
investment is its dazzling array of investment incentives. These in-
123. According to the most recent data available, the annual rate of return on all U.S.
direct private investment in Latin America was 15.8 percent for 1981 and 8.6 percent for
1982. The annual rate of return for U.S. direct investment in Brazil was only 3.3 and 6.3
percent respectively for these years. U.S. Dept. of Comm., 63 SuRVEY oF CuiRENrT Bus. 11,
23-24, 29-30 (No. 8, Aug. 1983). Between 1971 and 1981 annual remittances on all registered
foreign capital in Brazil averaged about 4.2 percent. W. BAER, supra note 7, at 187, 188.
124. The 25 percent tax is due and must be withheld at the time the excess cruzeiros
are paid to the foreign investor, regardless of whether these cruzeiros are ever remitted
abroad. Decree-Law No. 1.401 of May 7, 1975, art. 4. Permission from the Central Bank is
required to remit any amount in excess of the registered capital, and the Central Bank will
generally refuse such permission. A. ANDRADE, supra note 38, at 171. On the other hand,
foreign investors are free to sell their investment outside of Brazil for foreign currency or
stock whose value exceeds the registered capital, but the buyer's ability to remit profits or to
repatriate capital will be limited to the amount shown on the registration certificate plus
subsequent registered reinvestments.
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centives consist of a continually changing mixture of subsidized
financing, tax credits and tariff exemptions."' Most of these incen-
tives are available to both domestic and foreign-controlled firms,
but some are restricted to Brazilian-controlled firms.
All Brazilian taxpayers are permitted to take a tax credit for a
certain percentage of their Brazilian income tax for investments in
economically depressed regions, such as the Northeast or the Ama-
zon, or in activities deemed particularly desirable, such as fishing,
tourism or reforestation. These tax credit funds are allocated by
governmental agencies on a matching funds basis for approved in-
vestment projects. The taxpayer receives shares of a mutual fund,
which in turn receives non-voting shares in the corporations oper-
ating the projects. These shares are non-transferable for four to
five years. Any dividend payments on these shares is set quite low,
making these tax credit funds a very inexpensive form of equity
financing.126 Investment projects are approved on a case-by-case
basis by the relevant agency. Normally, approval brings with it a
considerable degree of governmental control over the investment
project. Project approval also carries with it an exemption from the
income tax and other indirect taxes for a 10 to 15 year period, sub-
sidized credit from government development banks and the privi-
lege of importing capital equipment duty-free or at sharply
reduced tariff rates.1 27
125. For descriptions of the basic incentives, see B. CARL, A GumE To INCENTIVES FOR
INVESTING IN BRA2EL (1972); P. GARLAND, DOING BusINEss IN AND WITH BRAZIL 52-67 (1978);
Gouvea Vieira, supra note 108; Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, Incentives for Investment in
Brazil, 13 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 123 (1981).
126. Legal entities can earmark up to 50 percent their total income tax for investment
in the shares of the Northeast Investment Fund (FINOR) or the Amazon Investment Fund
(FINAM). The comparable tax incentive for individuals was eliminated by Decree-Law No.
2.065 of Oct. 26, 1983. These mutual funds then invest in projects that the Superintendency
for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) or the Superintendency for the Develop-
ment of the Amazon (SUDAM) deem desirable for the economic and social development of
their respective regions. In exceptional cases, such as when a corporate taxpayer has its own
approved project, the tax credit may be applied directly to that project. Taxpayers can also
receive tax credits for investing in the Sectorial Investment Fund (FISET). Up to 12 percent
of any tax owed can be invested in tourism projects; up to 25 percent in fishing projects; up
to 35 percent in reforestation projects; up to 1 percent in EMBRAER, the government-
controlled aircraft manufacturer; and for companies with head offices in the State of Espir-
ito Santo, up to 33 percent in a special fund for that state's reconstruction (GERES). There
is an overall limitation of 50 percent of the tax due for each legal entity, increased to 51
percent if the taxpayer invests in EMBRAER. Income Tax Reg., art. 492. These tax credit
funds are deemed domestic investment and cannot be registered with the Central Bank for
foreign remittance purposes.
127. P. GARLAND, supra note 125, at 60-61.
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The Industrial Development Council (CDI) reviews and ap-
proves, on a case-by-case basis, industrial projects it deems in the
national interest.12 8 CDI currently grants the following incentives:
(1) exemption from import duties for equipment and machinery
not produced in the country and for component parts that supple-
ment national production, (2) exemption from the Tax on Indus-
trialized Products (IPI), and the Tax on the Circulation of Mer-
chandise (ICM) for the purchase of domestically manufactured
capital goods, (3) depreciation for income tax purposes at three
times the normal rates and (4) subsidized governmental financing.
Total tariff and IPI exemptions are reserved for projects in the na-
tional interest that are approved by the President of the Republic.
On lower priority projects, CDI can grant 50 to 80 percent reduc-
tions in import duties, the IPI and the ICM. In order to stimulate
the production of component parts in Brazil, granting of CDI ben-
efits is frequently conditioned upon compliance with pre-estab-
lished indexes of national content that must be met by certain tar-
get dates. 2"9
CDI utilizes incentives to control investment. It generally re-
quires that industrial projects be designed to replace imports, to
promote exports or to help reduce regional imbalances. In its early
years of operation, CDI granted incentives quite freely. Since the
1974 balance-of-payments crunch, CDI has become increasingly se-
lective and has been actively discouraging small projects. The
number of projects approved has declined sharply, while the aver-
age investment per approved project has jumped substantially.1 30
CDI incentives are available to both foreign controlled and do-
mestic industries, and many projects of foreign-controlled firms
have been approved. In deciding whether to grant incentives to
foreign investors, the factors which CDI currently considers posi-
tive include: (1) the presence of a Brazilian partner; (2) inclusion
of Brazilians in important managerial positions; (3) location of the
investment outside the SAo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo
Horizonte triangle; (4) bringing in a substantial percentage of the
project's capital requirements in the form of direct equity invest-
128. Tyler, Restricbes a Importatao e Incentivos Fiscais para o Setor de Bens de Capi-
tal no Brasil: 1975/79, 10 PPSQUISA E PLANWJAMENTO EcoNbmico 435 (1980). "
129. P. GARLAND, supra note 125, at 61-63; Robock, supra note 43, at 64-65.
130. In 1973, CDI approved 2,851 projects with an average investment of $1,300,000
each. In 1979, CDI approved only 130 projects with an average investment of $13,200,000.
Tyler, supra note 128, at 447.
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ment from abroad; and (5) bringing advanced technology to Brazil.
In the past year, CDI has been actively seeking out potential for-
eign investors, preferring those willing to engage in joint ventures
with Brazilian capital. If tax incentives have been granted to a
Brazilian company, CDI frequently requires that the beneficiary
agree not to transfer control of its shares to foreigners without first
obtaining CDI's consent. Breach of this covenant normally results
in loss of the benefits received.18'
A substantial set of incentives are available to exporters. Ex-
porters of manufactured products can reduce their taxable income
for income tax purposes by the same proportion that export sales
bear to total sales.182 The 25 percent withholding tax on foreign
remittances may be reduced or refunded for an exporter's pay-
ments for interest, commissions, publicity, market research and
rents. 88 A drawback regime permits an exemption, suspension or
refund of import duties and the ICM on exported goods.'" Special
legislation even permits the tax-free importation of an entire fac-
tory into Brazil, so long as its output is essentially designed for
export.1 58
The Commission for the Concession of Fiscal Benefits and
Special Export Programs (BEFIEX) grants special incentives to
firms that agree to export manufactured products. e36 The incen-
tives normally granted include: a 70 to 90 percent reduction of im-
port duties and IPI on imported machinery and equipment; a 50
percent reduction on import duties and IPI on imported raw
materials, components and intermediate parts; and a complete in-
come tax exemption on profits attributable to exports of manufac-
tured products. BEFIEX also has the power to permit Brazilian
companies to use any supplementary tax on dividends in excess of
12 percent of registered capital paid to foreign shareholders as a
credit against the Brazilian company's own federal taxes, s7 as well
as to extend any tax loss carried forward by two additional
131. Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, supra note 125, at 133.
132. Income Tax Reg., art. 290. Unless renewed, this benefit expires in fiscal year 1985.
133. Id., arts. 561, 563.
134. Decree No. 68.904 of July 12, 1971.
135. Decree-Law No. 1.244 of Oct. 31, 1972.
136. BEFIEX consists of one representative from each of the following governmental
organs: Ministry of the Treasury, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Planning, Customs
Policy Council, CACEX and the Secretary of Federal Receipts. It was created by Decree-
Law No. 1.219 of May 15, 1972, and was originally linked to the Treasury Ministry. Decree
No. 74.199 of June 21, 1974, transferred it to the Commerce Ministry.
137. Income Tax Reg., art. 310.
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years.1 s These benefits may not, however, be enjoyed simultane-
ously with other tax incentives. If the President of the Republic
deems the export program important to the economic interests of
the country, full import duty and IPI exemptions can be granted.
Companies wishing to obtain BEFIEX incentives must sign an
export commitment and meet certain FOB values for average
yearly exports. In addition, the value of goods imported by these
firms may not exceed one-third of the net value of their average
yearly export of manufactured products. Export commitments are
normally signed for ten years; nevertheless, recent commitments
have been permitted for as little as five years. In response to a
trade dispute with the United States, Brazil recently eliminated
the IPI credit for the BEFIEX program. Firms that neither signed
a new agreement with BEFIEX nor extended an existing agree-
ment by March 1983, are no longer be eligible for the IPI credit.139
Additional export financing is available from the Export Fi-
nancing Fund of the Bank of Brazil (FINEX), which makes sub-
sidized financing available to industrial companies that want to be-
gin or increase foreign sales of their products. ' ° Short-term
financing from commercial banks is also available at subsidized in-
terest rates.' 1
The National Bank for Economic and Social Development
(BNDES) grants a number of incentives that are only available to
companies controlled by Brazilian capital. BNDES is a source of
heavily subsidized long-term financing. It also has four special sub-
sidized financing programs to aid Brazilian firms in modernizing
their equipment, engaging in research and development projects,
expanding the capital of small or medium sized companies, and
stimulating the purchase of machinery, equipment and capital
goods produced in Brazil.""9
Brazilian government officials frequently use their powers to
grant or withhold incentives to prevent foreign investors from buy-
ing out existing Brazilian-owned firms or to induce foreign inves-
tors to enter into joint ventures with domestic private capital and/
or state capital. Even though no law may require a foreign investor
138. Id., art. 313.
139. Bus. Lat. Am., Sept 15, 1982, at 294.
140. Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, supra note 125, at 135.
141. Id.; French, Brazil's Profit Remittance Law: Reconciling Goals in Foreign Invest-
ments, 14 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 399, 446 (1982).
142. Pinheiro Neto & Dias da Silva, supra note 125, at 136-38.
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to acquire a Brazilian partner, the presence of such a partner fre-
quently makes the difference between having a project approved or
rejected.14
G. Restrictions on Foreign Investors
Most countries reserve certain sensitive areas of their econo-
mies to their own governments or to domestic capital. Brazil is no
exception. The government monopolizes a few sensitive areas,
while others are exclusively reserved for domestic capital. To in-
vest in certain areas, foreigners must associate themselves with lo-
cal investors; to invest in others, they need merely organize a Bra-
zilian legal entity. Brazilian law requires national treatment for
foreign capital;14 4 nevertheless, in several areas, foreign capital is
subject to special constraints. When viewed in comparative per-
spective, however, these constraints on foreign investors are rela-
tively mild.14
A few economic activities are off limits to the foreign investor
because the government has a monopoly. The government-con-
trolled oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. - Petrobris (Pe-
trobris), monopolizes oil exploration, research and drilling. '1 4
Since 1976, Petrobras has permitted foreign oil companies to pros-
pect for petroleum pursuant to risk contracts requiring the foreign
oil companies to set up Brazilian branches or subsidiaries. 4 7 Other
government monopolies or near monopolies include distribution of
electricity, telecommunications, lotteries, railways, ports and other
143. P. EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE AND
LOCAL CAPITAL IN BRAZIL 200-05 (1979).
144. Article 153 of the Constitution "assures Brazilians and resident aliens the inviola-
bility of their rights to life, liberty, security, and property, in the following terms: § 1. All
are equal before the law... ." The equivalent language in the 1946 Constitution has been
interpreted by the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Brazil's highest court, as guaranteeing the
right of property to non-resident aliens as well. R. E. No. 33.919, Agkncia A. C., Fernandes
Ltda. v. Henrique Barbosa & Cia., 3 R.T.J. 566 (1957). In addition, the Profit Remittance
Law provides: "Identical juridical treatment to national capital under conditions of equality
shall be dispensed to foreign capital invested in the country, prohibiting any discrimination
not provided for in this law." Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 2.
145. See R. ROBINSON, NATIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN BUSINESS ENTRY: A SURVEY OF
FIFTEEN COUNTRIES xix-xxiii (1976), showing that Brazil had the least restrictive barriers to
foreign investment of all fifteen countries in the study.
146. Law No. 2.004 of Oct. 3, 1953, art. 29.
147. Keener, Brazil-Petroleum Exploration, Evaluation, and Development under the
Petrobras Risk Contract System, 1 HousToN J. INT'L L. 95 (1979).
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public services.14
Constitutional constraints exclude foreigners from participa-
tion in a few areas. The Constitution expressly bars foreigners
from the communications media and coastal shipping compa-
nies."" Although the Constitution also limits participation in min-
ing or hydroelectric power to Brazilians or Brazilian legal enti-
ties, 50 any legal entity organized in Brazil is deemed to satisfy this
requirement, even if it is entirely owned by foreigners.
Domestic airline concessions are restricted to Brazilian corpo-
rations whose head office or place of control is located in Brazil. At
least 4/5 of the voting shares must be owned by Brazilians and no
voting shares can be transferred to non-Brazilians, even if they will
own less than 1/5 of the voting stock. In addition, direction of the
corporation must be exclusively in the hands of Brazilians. 6'
The 1962 Profit Remittance Law prohibits a foreign bank
from acquiring more than 30 percent of the voting shares of Brazil-
ian banks if the laws of the country in which the foreign bank has
its head office, impose any restrictions on Brazilian banks.15 2 The
Profit Remittance Law also imposes on every foreign bank author-
ized to operate in Brazil the same restrictions imposed on Brazilian
banks by the laws of the country of the foreign bank's head of-
fice. 15 Although no law formally prohibits foreign banks from es-
tablishing branches in Brazil, the Central Bank must give prior ap-
proval. The Central Bank has an unwritten policy of refusing
virtually all requests by foreign banks for permission to establish
new branches, but the rights of existing foreign branch banks have
been respected.' 54 The Central Bank also has a policy of refusing
to allow foreign investors to own more than one-third of the voting
148. Helander, Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in Latin America, in 4 A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS 222, 264-65 (W. Surrey & D.
Wallace eds., 2d ed. 1980).
149. Const., arts. 174 and 173 (1967), as amended (1969). The restriction on foreign
participation in the media is in practice often circumvented or ignored. G. RAszLO, 0 CAPi-
TAL ESTRANGEIRO NA IMPRENSA BRASILEIRA (1966).
150. Const., art. 168(1) (1967), as amended (1969).
151. Decree-Law No. 32 of Nov. 18, 1966, art. 69, as regulated by Decree No. 72.898 of
Oct. 9, 1973, art. 10.
152. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 51.
153. Id., art. 50.
154. The number of foreign banks established in Brazil has only grown from 10 in 1948
to 19 in 1976 because of this unwritten policy of the Central Bank. Tavares & Teixeira,
Transnational Enterprises and the Internationalization of Capital in Brazilian Industry,
14 CEPAL REV. 85, 103-04 (Aug. 1981).
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shares or more than one-half of the total capital of investment
banks."'
Foreigners may acquire undeveloped rural land only under
certain conditions. Corporations controlled directly or indirectly by
foreign capital must secure prior approval from the Ministry of Ag-
riculture to purchase rural land for agricultural, livestock, indus-
trial or colonization projects.158 Foreign individuals need permis-
sion from the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (INCRA) to acquire more than three units of rural land."'
Any single foreigner, or foreign corporation, is prohibited from
owning more than one-fourth of the total area of a county
(municipio). Further, foreigners of the same nationality may not
own more than 40 percent of any municipio. 15 8 In addition, in
zones within 150 kilometers of Brazil's frontiers, Brazilians must
own, and predominantly manage, at least 51 percent of the capital
of any firm engaged in arms manufacture, mining, electric energy
or communications.159
In recent years, foreigners have been foreclosed from a number
of other economic activities. Highway transportation is restricted
to firms in which Brazilians own at least 80 percent of the stock.
Moreover, all the directors and managers of such firms must be
Brazilians.1' Foreign investors may not acquire, either directly or
indirectly, more than one-third of the capital of insurance compa-
nies or brokers, but the rights of existing investors have been
"grandfathered."''l An unpublished Central Bank policy prohibits
foreign capital from controlling more than one-third of the voting
stock of leasing and finance companies. The government generally
insists that Brazilians own a majority c.f the equity in virtually all
large mining projects. In petrochemical ventures, the government
has generally pushed for a three-way split among state capital, pri-
155. See Helander, supra note 148, at 265.
156. Law 5.709 of Oct. 7, 1971, art. 5 § 1, as regulated by Decree No. 74.965 of Nov. 26,
1974.
157. Law No. 5.709 of Oct. 7, 1971, art. 3 § 1. A unit is theoretically the minimum
amount considered necessary to support a family, and it varies in size between 5 and 100
hectares.
158. Law No. 5.709 of Oct. 7, 1971, art. 12.
159. Law No. 2.597 of Sept. 12, 1955. Any acquisition of real estate within a security
zone requires prior approval of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council.
Law No. 5.709 of Oct. 7, 1971, art. 7.
160. Law No. 6.813 of July 10, 1980.
161. PINHEIRO NETo, DOING BusirNss IN BRAZIL 274 (1979).
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vate Brazilian capital and foreign capital.'
In a few areas, Brazil has adopted a policy of reserving all or
part of a market for Brazilian firms. Thus, in order to stimulate
the development of a domestic film industry, Brazilian law requires
that a theater showing a full-length foreign film must also exhibit a
Brazilian-made short-length cultural or news film. Moreover, full-
length Brazilian films must be featured in all Brazilian theaters for
a determined number of days each year.1 "
The most important application of the reserved market ap-
proach is in data processing and related fields. The Special Secre-
tariat for Informatics (SEI), which must approve all technology
transfer agreements (in addition to INPI) and imports relating to
data processing (in addition to CACEX), has mandated a rigorous
preference for Brazilian equipment in any purchases of equipment
by governmental agencies. 164 It has also developed an extremely
broad view of "similarity" as a device for rejecting requests to im-
port foreign computers and components.8 5 Continuing and ex-
panding upon a 1977 policy determined by its predecessor,' SEI
has also reserved the mini- and micro-computer industries, as well
as testing and measuring instrumentation systems, to Brazilian
firms. SEI approval of all new data processing and testing and
measuring projects is being withheld unless control of the stock
and effective power for orientation and functioning is permanently
and exclusively in the hands of persons who are both residents and
domiciliaries of Brazil, and the project utilizes technology devel-
oped in Brazil. 6 ' In addition, government agencies and enterprises
are prohibited from hiring foreign engineering, consulting or data
processing firms unless Brazilian firms are either unavailable or
unable to perform the needed service."6 " In such event, the policy
162. P. EVANS, supra note 143, at 228-49.
163. Law No. 6.281 of Dec. 9, 1975, arts. 13, 14. See also Decree of the Council of
Ministers No. 544 of Jan. 31, 1962, art. 3, requiring TV stations to show at least one
Brazilian film per week.
164. SEI, Normative Act No. 5 of June 25, 1980.
165. SEI, Normative Act No. 14 of Mar. 18, 1981. "National instruments of analogous
technology shall be considered similar to imported digital technology when intended for the
same use." Id., art. 1, sole para.
166. See Vidal, Brazil Declares Computer Independence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1978,
Sec. 3, at 3, cols. 1-4. SEI's predecessor was the Commission for the Coordination of Elec-
tronic Processing Activities (CAPRE).
167. SEI, Normative Acts No. 16 of July 10, 1981 and No. 24 of May 31, 1983.
168. Decree No. 64.345 of Apr. 10, 1969, as amended by Decrees No. 66.717 of June 15,
1970 and 66.864 of July 10, 1970; SEI, Normative Act No. 23 of Jan. 17, 1983, permitting
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of the government is to employ a foreign-controlled firm only if it
agrees to associate itself with a Brazilian firm in performing the
contract.
SEI must also approve all international data links. Corpora-
tions are encouraged to use local data processing, even if this re-
quires importation of equipment not yet available in Brazil. Corpo-
rations wishing access to foreign data bases are encouraged to
install and operate copies of those data bases in Brazil."' Recently,
Brazil established a national registry of software to encourage local
production of software and to guard against importation of unnec-
essary software."10
1. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FOREIGN INVESTORS
Government agencies constantly pressure foreign firms to ac-
cept local partners and to increase the percentage of Brazilian con-
tent in their products as a quid pro quo for subsidized financing,
tax incentives, import privileges or relaxation of price controls.
Brazilian financing agencies, such as the BNDES programs, Fi-
nancing for Small and Medium-sized Business (FIPEME) and the
Fund for the Financing of the Acquisition of Industrial Machinery
and Equipment (FINAME), discriminate against foreign-control-
led firms in extending subsidized credit. The usual rationale is that
multinational firms can tap the international loan market more
easily, and at more favorable rates, than can Brazilian firms. An
increasing number of fiscal and financial incentives are being de-
nied to foreign-controlled firms.171
Government regulatory policy has been to require the private
governmental agencies to contract for data processing services only with a Brazilian com-
pany, which is defined as a Brazilian legal entity, established on a permanent and uncondi-
tional basis and operating under the decision-making, technological and capital control of
individuals resident and domiciled in Brazil with at least two-thirds of its technological staff
made up of Brazilians. Governmental agencies can contract with foreign companies for data
processing services only with the special consent of the SEI.
169. Hummer, International Legal Principles: Common Law and Civil Law, in PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1982, 71, 81
(M. Landwehr ed. 1982). As of March 1982, SEI had approved 23 out of 32 applications for
transnational computer communications systems, while two applications were pending. Five
of the seven denied were applications for data systems; these were rejected because the
applicants had failed to ensure that information structuring and information resources
would be located in Brazil. Id.
170. SEI, Normative Act No. 22 of Dec. 2, 1982.
171. See supra notes 142-43 and the accompanying text.
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banking system to make an increasing percentage of its loans to
Brazilian-controlled firms. The Central Bank requires that 70 per-
cent of all credit extended by banks, credit companies and
financial institutions must go to Brazilians or locally controlled
firms.17 2 The remaining 30 percent must be divided between mul-
tinational and state companies. Prior to 1980, foreign-controlled
firms could freely tap the domestic credit market by selling deben-
tures. In 1980, the Securities Commission (CVM), invoking an un-
written rule, began requiring that foreign-controlled firms bring
equity capital into Brazil in an amount equal to that raised by is-
suing debentures. 17 8 In 1982, the CVM raised the ante, requiring
fresh foreign funds equal to three times the value of debentures
sold by foreign-controlled firms on the Brazilian capital market.'
7
'
2. THE 1976 CORPORATION LAW
In 1976, Brazil adopted a well-drafted, modern corporation
law.17 5 This statute, which was carefully designed to stimulate the
Brazilian capital market, has produced several significant changes
in the foreign investment climate.
The Corporation Law substantially enhances the legal protec-
tion available to minority shareholders. 176 This makes it more at-
tractive for the foreign investor to take a minority position in a
joint venture with Brazilian capital, which is virtually a must for a
mining venture. 1 The new corporation law also provides for com-
pulsory dividend distributions of 50 percent of the net profits of a
sociedade an6nima (a stock corporation), unless the charter pro-
vides for a lower percentage. 178 If it were not circumventable, this
provision would make it more difficult to build up a remittance
base by reinvesting earnings in Brazil.
One of the loudest complaints of Brazilian nationalists has
been against the denationalization of Brazilian industry by foreign
takeovers. While foreign investors have acquired a substantial
172. Central Bank Res. No. 656 of Dec. 17, 1980.
173. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 188.
174. Central Bank Res. No. 755 of Aug. 12, 1982.
175. Law No. 6.404 of Dec. 15, 1976.
176. PINHEIRO NETo, supra note 161, at §§ 4.151-4.168.
177. See Decree-Law No. 1.240 of Oct. 11, 1972, providing substantial incentives to
mining ventures that are Brazilian-controlled.
178. Law No. 6.404 of Dec. 15, 1976, art. 202. This percentage can be reduced as low as
25 percent by charter provision. Id.
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number of private Brazilian companies, in the past decade the per-
centage of foreign ownership of the Brazilian economy appears to
have declined significantly, while the percentage of state ownership
has increased dramatically. '7 9 Brazil has never formally required
prior approval for foreigners to acquire a domestic firm,180 but a
last minute amendment to the corporation law, the so-called Leh-
man Amendment, has made it more difficult for foreign companies
to take over existing Brazilian firms. The Amendment requires
CVM approval prior to acquiring a controlling interest in any com-
pany whose shares are traded on a stock exchange or over the
counter. Moreover, any takeover bid has to include a simultaneous
offer of common shares to the general public, and the minority
shareholders must be offered the same terms for their common
shares as are offered to the controlling shareholders." '
Another amendment requires that all members of the board of
directors and administrative councils of Brazilian companies be
Brazilian residents, creating minor problems for foreign investors
operating sociedades annimas.'e2 In Brazil, the administrative
councils serve the general policymaking functions of U.S. boards of
directors, while the directors discharge most of the management
functions of officers of U.S. corporations. In the past, it was com-
mon practice for members of the administrative councils of for-
eign-controlled Brazilian companies to be non-residents and make
occasional trips to Brazil for council meetings. Companies with
closed capital can dispense with the administrative council, but
companies with open capital must move key personnel to Brazil or
operate with straw representatives on the council.
3. PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Brazil does not permit non-residents to invest in Brazilian
companies by directly purchasing stock on the Brazilian stock mar-
ket. Since 1975, however, non-residents have been permitted to
179. W. BAER, supra note 7, at 213. See also R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC AND
NONECONOMIC POWER 109-11 (Rep. to Subcom. Multinat'l Corps. Sen. Com. on For. Rel.,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975).
180. Such legislation was drafted as a decree-law in 1975 but never published in the
Didrio Oficial. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 206, n. 100. There have been isolated cases, such as
Phillips-Consul, where the Brazilian government blocked a foreign takeover of a domestic
firm. Pinheiro Neto, Multinationals in Brazil, 8 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 311, 317 (1976).
181. Law No. 6.404 of Dec. 15, 1976, art. 254.
182. Id., arts. 145, 146, and 162.
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make portfolio investments in Brazilian companies through the
purchase of shares in mutual funds (called Decree-Law 1.401
funds), administered by special management companies under
Central Bank supervision.'88 Investments are made through sub-
scription agents in the investor's home country, pursuant to agency
agreements registered with the Central Bank. All mutual fund in-
vestments must be registered with the Central Bank in order to be
able to remit dividends, capital gains and capital repatriation.
A series of restrictions has circumscribed the operation of
these mutual funds and has made foreign portfolio investment in
Brazilian companies quite unattractive. 184 All mutual fund shares
must be sold outside of Brazil, and, no Brazilian resident or com-
pany may acquire the shares of a Decree-Law 1.401 fund. The
boards of directois of the special management companies must
consist solely of Brazilian residents holding no shares of the De-
cree-Law 1.401 funds they are managing. The management compa-
nies must invest at least 50 percent of their portfolio investments
in shares or convertible debentures of open capital corporations
controlled by private Brazilian shareholders. The remaining 50
percent (or less) can be applied in ORTNs; 88 nonconvertible de-
bentures of open capital companies controlled by private Brazilian
shareholders; stock of any corporation listed on a Brazilian stock
exchange, including foreign-controlled companies; and registered
new issues of stock in Brazilian corporations. The portfolios of the
mutual funds must also be diversified. Not more than 10 percent of
any mutual fund's portfolio can be invested in a single corporation,
nor can any mutual fund own more than 10 percent of the voting
shares of any Brazilian corporation. No mutual fund can own more
than 20 percent of the total capital of a Brazilian corporation, nor
may its average investment in any single corporation exceed 5 per-
cent of the fund's total portfolio.
. Originally, foreign investors were required to leave their port-
folio investments in Brazil for a minimum of three years, after
which they could begin repatriating a maximum of 20 percent of
their capital each six months. 88 Tax incentives were offered to en-
courage investors to keep their capital in the country for longer
183. Decree-Law 1.401 of May 7, 1975.
184. Regulations to Central Bank Res. No. 323 of May 8, 1975.
185. An ORTN is a Readjustable Treasury Bond. Seegenerally, Roe, Finance Rules
and the Indexation of Brazilian Government Bonds, 12 VAlo. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1979).
186. Regulations to Central Bank Res. No. 323 of May 8, 1975, arts. 19 and 23.
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periods." 7 In an effort to increase the thus far disappointing
amounts of foreign investment made through these Decree-Law
1.401 funds, the minimum holding period has been reduced, first to
two years, and recently to 90 days. 86
H. Labor Restrictions
Like many other nations, Brazil tries to preserve job opportu-
nities for its nationals. Brazilian labor law requires that two-thirds
of the employees of every commercial or industrial firm must be
Brazilian, and that the Brazilian employees must receive two-
thirds of the firm's payroll."8' For the purposes of this law, foreign-
ers who have resided in Brazil for at least ten years and who have a
Brazilian spouse or child are considered Brazilian." 0 Relief from
this two-thirds rule can be obtained only if both the National La-
bor Department and the Social Security Statistical Department
certify that a shortage of qualified Brazilian workers exists for the
jobs in question. Brazilians must also receive the same compensa-
tion as foreigners for equivalent work."' If a firm has to lay off
workers, non-Brazilians must be laid off prior to dismissal of
Brazilians performing the same work. 192 Practically speaking, these
requirements have created few problems for foreign firms operat-
ing in Brazil.
I. Price Controls
Despite decades of proven ineffectiveness in controlling infla-
tion, price controls have become a more or less permanent feature
of governmental regulation of business in Brazil. Several agencies
perform price control functions. The National Superintendency of
Supplies (SUNAB) controls the prices of essential foodstuffs. The
Superintendency of Private Insurance (SUSEP) sets insurance
rates, while the National Petroleum Council (NPC) sets gasoline
prices.
187. Decree-Law 1.401 of May 7, 1975, art. 5. See supra notes 116-18 and the accompa-
nying text.
188. 0 Estado de Slo Paulo, Jan. 12, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
189. Consolidated Labor Laws [hereinafter cited as CLT], Decree-Law No. 5.452 of
May 1, 1943, art. 354. The two-thirds rule does not apply to rural or agricultural firms.
190. CLT, art. 353.
191. CLT, art. 358. Exceptions are created for seniority, commission payments and ex-
perience differences. Id.
192. CLT, art. 358, sole para.
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The principal price control agency is the Interministerial Price
Council (CIP), which reports to the Ministry of Planning. In the
late 1970s, CIP controlled the prices of most industrial products
and some consumer goods, as well as public utility rates. Like a
number of Brazilian agencies, CIP has regulated without issuing
clearly defined rules. In addition to trying to contain inflation, CIP
has made an effort to reward efficiency and to stimulate the devel-
opment of local industry. If a firm imported items that CIP be-
lieved could have been purchased locally, CIP often either pared
the price increase sought or withheld approval until concessions
with regard to greater local content were forthcoming. CIP actions
have been particularly hard on foreign pharmaceutical firms, some
of which have been forced to operate in the red. 93
At the end of 1979, a significant change was made in Brazilian
price control policy. Instead of permitting price increases whenever
justified by increasing costs, Brazil decided to limit firms to only
two price increases a year. These increases were to correspond to
increases in the general price level rather than to increases in a
firm's actual costs. The results of the policy were predictably disas-
trous. Business profits and investment fell sharply, and many firms
had serious losses. In November 1980, the government abandoned
this strategy, permitting most firms to operate without controls
under a regime denominated "Accompanied Liberty."1 94 In the
wake of the February 1983 maxi-devaluation, price controls were
reimposed on 299 products and four types of services. Firms are
now compelled to obtain special permission from CIP to increase
prices on these items by more than 80 percent of the percentage
increase in the ORTN rate.'93 Since the rate of monetary correc-
tion on ORTNs is less than 80 percent of the inflation rate, the
prices of controlled items are falling substantially in real terms.'"
193. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 183.
194. Bus. Lat. Am., Nov. 12, 1980, at 361-62. Under this regime firms were free to set
prices, provided they did not go beyond what CIP deemed to be tolerable limits.
195. Portaria No. 16 of 1983 of the Interministerial Price Council, Di6rio Oficial-1, June
29, 1983.
196. During 1983, the unexpurgated general price index rose by 211 percent, while the
ORTN rose by only 156.6 percent. Without special dispensation, the maximum increase per-
mitted for prices controlled by CIP during this period was only 125.3 percent, slightly less
than 60 percent of the reported inflation rate.
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III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S REGULATORY SCHEME
Brazil's Profit Remittance Law was enacted more than twenty
years ago when much foreign investment was in public utilities or
other forms of monopoly. This gave rise to the suspicion that for-
eign investors were earning unreasonably high rates of return. The
law was enacted in a climate of intense nationalism and great po-
litical agitation. The President never even signed the law, prefer-
ring to allow the President of the Senate to promulgate it. The
Executive did not issue the regulatory decree necessary for the
state's implementation until 16 months after its promulgation. Al-
though several of the statute's most objectionable features were re-
voked in 1964, the framework remains basically that of the poorly
conceived 1962 profit remittance control scheme. That scheme con-
tains numerous technical defects.
First, the Profit Remittance Law naively assumes that the ra-
tio between invested capital and net profits does not vary greatly
from industry to industry. Consequently, the 12 percent remit-
tance limit severely discriminates against service firms, such as
those of accountants, engineers or lawyers, whose registered capital
base is generally quite low in relation to their net earnings. It also
discriminates against firms in high risk activities, such as mineral
exploration, where one would expect to earn higher returns in the
event of a felicitous strike. An intelligent attempt to prevent remit-
tance of unreasonably high rates of profit ought to factor risk dis-
parities and capital-labor intensivity into its regulatory scheme in-
stead of setting across-the-board figures.
Second, the fiat prohibition on the remittance of patent and
trademark royalties to related corporations is a blunderbuss ap-
proach to the common problem of income shifting by multination-
als. Prior to September 1983, a multinational could circumvent
this prohibition handily by transferring technology to its Brazilian
subsidiary from another subsidiary that owns no stock in the Bra-
zilian transferee, rather than by making the transfer directly.lrI
INPI's Normative Act No. 64,'9 8 which requires that every foreign
parent of a Brazilian subsidiary that purchases technology from an
unrelated foreign company make an equity investment equivalent
197. See S. FuNG & J. CASSIOLATO, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OP TECHNOLOGY TO
BiRuzu THROUGH TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS-CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL CON-
TROL SYSTEM AND THE COMMaCIAL TRANSACTIONS 59 (1976).
198. See supra notes 89 and 90 and the accompanying text.
19831
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
to the remittance payments due for the technology, is an attempt
to eliminate this loophole. The probable effect of Normative Act
No. 64 will be to prevent foreign-controlled Brazilian subsidiaries
from acquiring technology from unrelated foreign firms, unless the
parent company finds it convenient to make an equity investment
in its Brazilian subsidiary at that time. This type of transfer ar-
rangement increases transaction costs considerably for purchasers
of foreign technology.
Related companies, however, are still free to make payments
for know-how and technical assistance,1 9" and a considerable
amount of manipulation of transfer pricing still occurs under the
guise of technical assistance payments. Indeed, a comprehensive
study disclosed that 62.1 percent of all foreign technology pay-
ments made by Brazilian firms were styled as technical assistance
payments.2 00 Once registration has been granted, INPI and the
Central Bank do little auditing to ensure that technical assistance
agreements are actually being performed and that the payments
cease when the technology has been absorbed.201 The regulatory
process simply results in a higher tax rate because the Brazilian
payor cannot deduct these payments as business expenses when
they are paid to a related party. If income is escaping taxation by
excessive royalties, the better way to handle the problem is to real-
locate the income or to disallow part of the attempted deduction.
Erecting a flat prohibition against the remittance of royalties be-
tween related firms badly distorts both the concept of an income
tax and proper accounting procedures.
Third, the percentage limitations upon remittances and de-
ductions for patent and trademark royalties are purely arbitrary,
as is the exigency that royalties be calculated as a percentage of
net sales. Royalties on all trademarks, regardless of commercial im-
portance, are limited to 1 percent of net sales.0 2 Radio and televi-
sion patents are limited to royalties of I percent of net sales, while
transformers and generators are limited to 5 percent. Tooth paste
and soap patents are limited to 2 percent of net sales, while chemi-
cal products may be as high as 4 percent. For example, if a seatbelt
199. Nevertheless, INPI is currently viewing these payments with a jaundiced eye and
is unlikely to approve them unless the know-how or technical assistance is deemed essential
for national develoment. Moreover, the Brazilian payor will not be able to deduct these
payments as business expenses.
200. S. FUNo & J. CASSIOLATO, supra note 197, at 65.
201. Id. at 111.
202. Supra note 76.
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is classified as an auto part, the maximum royalty permitted will
be 5 percent of net sales. On the other hand if it is classified as a
metal artifact, the maximum royalty will be 3.5 percent.2 0 3
Market conditions have produced myriad methods for calcu-
lating royalties. Royalties are often calculated as a percentage of
either gross or net sales, but it sometimes makes eminent sense to
calculate royalties as a percentage of savings in manufacturing
costs or a flat fee per unit of volume.2 0 ' Although 5-6 percent of net
sales is a common royalty rate,2' 0 there are many variations. Exclu-
sive licenses normally bring higher royalties than non-exclusive li-
censes. Royalties on technological "breakthroughs" are typically
higher than on refinements of pre-existing technology. In certain
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, 10 to 15 percent of net sales is
a common royalty for an exclusive license, while nonexclusive li-
censes commonly result in royalties from 4 to 7 percent.20 6 The vice
of the Brazilian system is that it attempts to prefix the proper roy-
alty rate with a group of meaningless categories administered by a
group of bureaucrats with no idea of what the "proper" royalty is
for a given technology. This approach has contributed significantly
to Brazil's image as a technological backwater, producing goods
that are not competitive in world markets.
Fourth, the Brazilian attempt to regulate technology transfer
is insufficiently coordinated among INPI, CACEX and SEI.
CACEX controls implicit technology transfer that occurs through
the importation of machinery and equipment, with SEI having a
veto on computer-related products. INPI controls explicit technol-
ogy transfer that occurs through licensing and technical assistance
agreements, subject to SEI's veto in the computer area. Even
though both types of technology transfer are interrelated, placing
control over them in different entities has resulted in a failure to
develop a unified approach.2 0 7
Fifth, the Profit Remittance Law assumes that the foreign cur-
203. Portaria No. 436 of the Ministry of Finance, Dec. 30, 1958, as amended. See J.
BULHOES PEDREIRA, supra note 109, at 9-21 to 9-23.
204. 1 L. ECKSTROM, supra note 62, at 9-157 to -161; Finnegan & Mintz, Determination
of a Reasonable Royalty in Negotiating a License Agreement: Practical Pricing for a Suc-
cessful Technology Trans/er, THE LAW AND BusiN~ss OF LICENSING 3D-3, 9-24 (R. Gold-
scheider & T. Arnold eds. 1982).
205. 1 L. ECKSTROM, supra note 62, at 9-156; Finnegan & Mintz, supra note 204, at 3D-
14.
206. Finnegan & Mintz, supra note 204, at 3D-14.
207. S. FUNG & J. CASSIOLATO, supra note 197, at 133.
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rencies in which investments have been registered do not suffer
from inflation. During the 1970s, however, not even the world's
strongest currencies retained their purchasing power. Paradoxi-
cally, Brazil, a world leader in indexing its economy for inflation, "
does not monetarily correct the real value of foreign investment to
assess its supplementary income tax. Yet the real value of a
$10,000,000 investment registered in U.S. dollars in 1967 was
roughly $30,000,000 at the start of 1983, while the real value of a
1967 investment of 10,000,000 French francs was roughly
39,000,000 francs. 2" Restricting a foreign investor to remitting 12
percent in 1983 dollars or francs on investments made in 1967 dol-
lars or francs limits remittances in real economic terms to 4 and 3
percent respectively. This distortion would be partially corrected if
the foreign investor were permitted to register as reinvestment, in
foreign currency, capital increases resulting from monetary correc-
tion of corporate balance sheets. The Central Bank's unwritten
policy, however, is to refuse such registration. 2 0 Further, the Cen-
tral Bank will not permit foreign investors to register passive in-
come stemming from investments in stocks or real estate as rein-
vestment. The Central Bank's policy, which has no basis in law, is
to restrict reinvestment to earnings from the active conduct of a
business."'
Sixth, the Profit Remittance Law, operating in tandem with
the Brazilian income tax structure, exacerbates Brazil's external
debt, as well as the ordinary "thin" capitalization problems, by of-
fering surprisingly substantial incentives to foreign investors to
register their investment as debt instead of equity. Remittable in-
terest on foreign loans is geared to market rates, while remittable
dividend income is fixed at 12 percent. In the past decade, with
dollar interest rates as high as 18-22 percent, the economic incen-
tive to structure investments as loans was especially powerful. Div-
idend income is taxed twice in Brazil: once at the normal corporate
rate when earned by a Brazilian enterprise, and again at 25 percent
when distributed to the foreign investor. 12 Interest income is
208. K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 376-81 (1982).
209. The U.S. Consumer Price Index increased by a factor of 2.92 between December
1967 and December 1982. 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 70 (Mar. 1983). Consumer prices in
France increased by a factor of 3.88 between 1967 and December 1982. IMF, Ieer'L FIN.
STAT. YEARBOOK 196-97 (1982) and IMF, 36 INT'L FIN. STAT. 169 (Mar. 1983).
210. A. ANDRADE, supra note 38, at 156; French, supra note 141, at 408.
211. French, supra note 141, at 401, n. 4.
212. Intercompany dividends are also subject to tax at the rate of 23 percent, creditable
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taxed only once, at 25 percent, when paid to the foreign lender.
Moreover, the Brazilian payor can deduct interest payments. An-
other incentive to structuring an investment in a Brazilian subsidi-
ary as debt is the rebate to the Brazilian subsidiary of a substan-
tial portion of the 25 percent withholding tax on interest
remittances, a benefit that is not available on dividend remit-
tances. Furthermore, in the event of a balance-of-payments crisis,
the Profit Remittance Law protects interest remittances from re-
duction. Therefore, it should not be surprising that an estimated
$8 billion of Brazil's foreign debt is essentially disguised equity in-
vestment,215 and that the tax incentives to induce foreign investors
to convert debt to equity have been largely ineffective.
Structuring an investment as a loan rather than as equity en-
courages the investor to remove his capital more rapidly. Declara-
tion of dividends is discretionary, whereas servicing debt is, within
reasonable tolerances, mandatory. Consequently, capital outflow is
likely to be more rapid with debt than with equity. Moreover, the
practice of disguising equity as debt distorts the statistics of Bra-
zil's foreign debt. Not only does the external debt appear larger
than it really is, but it is also impossible to know how large the
debt really is.
Seventh, the inflexibility of a 12 percent profit remittance lim-
itation fixed in nominal terms is highly undesirable. Brazil's effec-
tive limit of 12 percent on profit remittances is well below other
Latin American countries, including those with a very restrictive
attitude towards foreign investment, such as the Andean Common
Market."'" In the past decade, when investors were able to earn 18
to 20 percent returns on bonds or certificates of deposit in devel-
against the 25 percent withholding tax on foreign remittances. Income Tax Reg., art. 544, as
modified by Decree-Law No. 2.065 of Oct. 26, 1983, art. 1(I).
213. Estimate of Jos6 Carlos Madeira Serrano, head of the External Area of the Central
Bank, reported in the Jornal do Brasil, Dec. 31, 1982, 1st cad., at 17, cols. 2-3.
214. Decision 24 of the Andean Commission originally set a ceiling on net profit remit-
tances of 14 percent of registered capital. Recognizing that a 14 percent return was too low,
the Commission raised the ceiling to 20 percent in 1976. Since then, several ANCOM coun-
tries have either increased the ceiling or are presently exploring ways to do so. Resolution 4/
83 of CONITE, Peru's Foreign Investment Commission, permits firms to remit up to 40
percent of registered capital if they comply with certain conditions relating to export sales,
use of local inputs and location. Alternatively, firms can remit up to 10 percent above the
LIBOR rate that is in effect at the end of the month prior to the remittance. Bus. Lat. Am.,
Sept. 21, 1983, at 299. For a current summary of the remittance regulations of the Latin
American countries, see Bus. Lat. Am., Aug. 24, 1983, at 268-69; Bus. Lat. Am., Sept. 7,
1983, at 284-85.
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oped countries with relatively little risk, Brazil's 12 percent limita-
tion on equity returns looked ludicrously low.
Eighth, the Central Bank's general policy of refusing to permit
foreign investors to capitalize their technology makes no sense. To
the limited extent the Central Bank permits an investor to register
industrial property rights by symbolically selling them to a Brazil-
ian subsidiary, the 25 percent withholding tax levied upon the pro-
ceeds of the symbolic sale substantially discourages capital invest-
ment. Since no income is generated to pay this tax, the investor
must pay it from capital. This bizarre aspect of Brazil's regulatory
scheme discourages foreign investors from bringing much needed
modern technology into the country.
Ninth, the Profit Remittance Law creates needless tensions
between foreign and Brazilian joint venturors. The foreign inves-
tor, who often brings technology into the joint venture, is unable to
register that technology as part of his remittance base without pay-
ing a 25 percent tax on his capital contribution. The foreign inves-
tor generally wants to declare minimal dividends in order to build
up his remittance basis, while the Brazilian investor generally
wants to maximize his payout. The foreign investor generally
wants to characterize as much of his investment as possible as debt
in order to minimize remittance problems, while the Brazilian in-
vestor wants to maximize the equity brought in by the foreign in-
vestor. To be sure, a certain amount of tension is inevitable in joint
ventures between foreign and domestic investors, but the Brazilian
regulatory scheme needlessly exacerbates that tension.
Tenth, Brazil's curious refusal to permit foreign investors to
invest directly in stocks of their choice has been fatal to attracting
foreign capital to Brazil's stock market. Despite Brazil's expressed
desire to stimulate the stock market as a means of financing the
economic growth of private corporations, it has inexplicably re-
fused to open up the stock market to direct foreign portfolio in-
vestment. Given the thinness and volatility of the Brazilian mar-
ket, few investors are sufficiently irrational to lock in their capital
in a mutual fund for even three months. Predictably, in the past
five years, foreign portfolio investment in the stock market has to-
tailed only a disappointing $55 million.2 ' a It is likely to continue at
this dismal level until Brazil permits such investments directly.
215. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 12, 1982, 1st cad., at 27, col. 3; 0 Estado de Sio Paulo, Jan.
12, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
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Eleventh, Brazil defines foreign investment by using the inves-
tor's residence rather than his nationality. This leads to anomolous
results. For example, if a Brazilian living in Panama were to invest
funds in Brazil, his investment would be categorized as foreign so
long as his funds came from outside Brazil. On the other hand, a
Swiss citizen residing in Brazil would be unable to register a for-
eign investment, even if he brought in funds from abroad. This
paradox results from conceptualizing foreign investment in terms
of exchange control, but the result is illogical, even from that nar-
row perspective. If a foreign investor were to move to Brazil, it is
unclear whether the registration certificate would be nullified or
merely suspended.21 6
Perhaps the chief vice of the Brazilian regulatory scheme is
that it delegates nearly unlimited discretion to administrative
agencies like the Central Bank and INPI. These agencies operate
on the paternalistic premise that foreign firms have greater bar-
gaining power than the Brazilian firms with which they deal, and
that governmental intervention is both necessary and helpful to re-
dress the imbalance. By making themselves parties to contractual
negotiations between the foreign investor or lender and Brazilian
firms, Brazilian bureaucrats substantially increase the time, ex-
pense and uncertainties of the negotiation process.
Even though INPI and the Central Bank have published some
of the criteria used in deciding whether to approve foreign loans
and technology transfer agreements, they also operate on the basis
of unpublished rules. Moreover, even when the rules are known,
the Brazilian government feels no inhibitions about disappointing
legitimate expectations by changing the rules of the game in mid-
stream. All too frequently, Brazilian agencies make important and
sometimes retroactive modifications of the rules with little or no
notice to the public. 1'
The costs of regulating foreign investment in this style are
quite high and essentially unmeasured. The difficulty in knowing
the ground rules, coupled with frequent mid-stream changes, pro-
duces considerable insecurity among investors and businessmen.
As Max Weber so cogently observed, private investment requires a
legal system that offers security and predictability.1 Brazil's flex-
216. Compare Teixeira, supra note 41, at 8, with A. ANDRADE, supra note 38, at 9.
217. Rosenn, supra note 6, at 172-79.
218. 2 M. WEBm, ECONOMY AND Sociurv 883 (G. Roth & R. Wittich, eds. 1968).
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ible and cumbersome regulatory style enormously increases the
transaction costs of doing business. Part of these costs stem from
additional fees for lawyers and despachantes,219 and part result
from the income lost while investment projects are delayed as re-
negotiations proceed before the Central Bank and INPI. Worth-
while projects have been abandoned because of the difficulty in si-
multaneously obtaining all of the necessary governmental per-
missions.
Considerable amounts of technology have never been trans-
ferred to Brazil, either because some governmental agency refused
to approve the agreement or because the foreign licensor balked at
the conditions or delays. Here again, the result appears to deprive
Brazil of access to many of the really important technological ad-
vances taking place in the world. The immediate victims of the
government's restrictions are private Brazilian companies that are
deprived of needed technology and the mini- and medium-sized
multinationals that lack the capital to set up plants around the
world. The large multinationals can afford to set up manufacturing
plants in Brazil, thereby reaping the benefits of their technology
through direct sales. Paradoxically, the government's activities in
making licensing unattractive and importation virtually impossible
serve to immunize the large multinationals from technological
competition with smaller foreign and domestic firms in the Brazil-
ian market. This translates into higher prices and inferior products
for the Brazilian consumer.
IV. A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
Despite its many flaws, the Brazilian scheme for regulating
foreign investment has several positive features. The judicious ap-
plication of the carrot and the stick has permitted Brazil to attract
a huge influx of foreign investment that has significantly contrib-
uted to the country's phenomenal economic growth during the past
15 years. Because multinationals are more concerned with maxi-
mizing their overall income than with promoting the economic and
social development of the countries in which they have invested,
Brazil has understandably felt the need to devise a strategy for
219. Despachantes are expediters or red tape cutters. These officially recognized pro-
fessionals are indispensable to securing any kind of document or permission from the Brazil-
ian bureaucracy. See Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal
System and its Developmental Implications, 19 Am. J. Coup. L. 514, 536-37 (1971).
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making foreign investors more responsive to the country's needs
and for achieving a pattern of foreign investment that contributes
effectively to the country's economic and social objectives. The un-
fettered discretion of the Brazilian bureaucracy in determining
whether to grant fiscal incentives, subsidized financing and tariff
reductions, or whether to apply the full weight of the complex reg-
ulatory apparatus, has proven highly effective in keeping foreign
capital under control and in causing multinationals to engage in
activities deemed highly beneficial to the country's economic pri-
orities.220 Without raising the hackles of foreign investors by im-
posing across-the-board disinvestment or nationalization require-
ments, Brazil has managed to achieve similar objectives in
sensitive areas through ad hoc negotiation and flexibly applied un-
written rules.
Brazil's restrictive policies on technology transfers may exas-
perate foreign investors, but they have sometimes served Brazil
reasonably well in fostering the development of national technol-
ogy and in paying the lowest possible prices for certain imported
technology. Brazil has calculated that the large multinationals
have already recovered their research and development costs by
exploiting their technology in the developed countries, making it
unnecessary to offer high rates of return on advanced technology to
attract foreign firms to the Brazilian market. As Professor Harry
Johnson has explained, this calculation is not irrational:
... [F]or most of the countries of the world, and especially
the less-developed countries, the contribution that the opportu-
nity to earn a profit in their markets makes to the encourage-
ment of investment in the creation of new commercial knowl-
edge is negligible, so that any profit they allow to be earned
from the command of advanced technology is for them a short-
run loss with no compensating long-run gain from the encour-
agement of technical progress. To make the point somewhat dif-
ferently, playing the rules of allowing monopoly gains to be
made from economically useful knowledge involves the cost of
paying for foreign knowledge that would probably be available
anyhow, in the hope of a gain from the reciprocal obligation on
foreign countries to pay monopoly profits on the use of knowl-
edge commanded by your own producers .... 21
220. For example, Brazil has had a fair amount of success in pressuring multinational
pharmaceutical companies to engage in backward integration and to set up research opera-
tions in Brazil. P. EVANS, supra note 143, at 187-94.
221. Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corpora-
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This calculus may change as Brazil develops more of its own tech-
nology. In the past, however, it has made a certain amount of sense
to conserve foreign exchange by sharply restricting payments for
the transfer of technology.
Of course, there has been an obvious conflict between Brazil's
open door policy towards foreign investment and its policy of aid-
ing domestic firms in acquiring foreign technology cheaply. To the
extent that Brazilian policies not only permit, but encourage set-
ting up operations directly in Brazil, foreign firms have a corre-
sponding disincentive to license their technology to Brazilian
firms.2 22 Those firms that bear the brunt of Brazilian policies mak-
ing technology licensing difficult are the small and medium-sized
foreign firms that would like to exploit the Brazilian market but
cannot afford to set up their own plants, as well as the Brazilian
firms that need to acquire foreign technology to compete ef-
fectively.
Brazilian restrictions on technology payments between related
companies may be justifiable, but just barely. Brazil has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting its fisc from tax evasion by the transfer
pricing policies of multinational firms. Shifting income either
downstream or upstream through non-arm's length sales or tech-
nology transfer agreements is a common tax planning device for
multinationals. Reallocating income in a realistic fashion is a diffi-
cult task, even for countries with well-trained cadres of sophisti-
cated tax collectors. While hardly optimal, Brazil's policy of bar-
ring all royalty payments between related companies and re-
stricting the deductibility of technical assistance payments be-
tween related companies is probably an acceptable second best
solution.
On the other hand, INPI's restrictive policies have also re-
sulted in higher costs both for imported and domestic technology.
INPI substantially increases transaction costs of technology trans-
fer; ultimately, these costs result in more expensive products. By
largely insulating imported and domestic technology from foreign
competition, INPI's activities permit companies to charge higher
prices in the Brazilian market. INPI's operations have also pre-
vented Brazil from importing needed technology. In the long run,
INPI's activities are saddling Brazil with increasingly obsolete
tion, in C. KINDLEBERGER (ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 35, 40 (1970).
222. S. Fung & J. Cassiolato, supra note 197, at 133.
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technology.
Even though the 12 percent limitation on profit remittances
lacks needed flexibility and is arguably too low for current market
conditions, the limitation does have some specific advantages. It
helps allay nationalist concerns about foreign investors earning un-
reasonably high rates of return and provides a substantial reinvest-
ment incentive. The felicitous 1964 amendment that permits the
addition of retained earnings to the remittance base has not only
made the measure more palatable, but has also had the beneficial
effect of attracting investors who are in Brazil for the long haul.
Moreover, the supplementary tax has not seriously constrained
most investors. In recent years, rates of return on foreign invest-
ment in Brazil have been considerably lower than in most Latin
American countries."2 3 With high rates of inflation and relatively
little access to local sources of credit, foreign firms operating in
Brazil need to retain substantial portions of their net profits irre-
spective of the existence of the supplemental tax.
Brazil has sensibly restricted access to subsidized local credit
by foreign firms. While the wisdom of granting these subsidies to
anyone is open to serious question, it makes little economic sense
to transfer scarce Brazilian capital to foreign investors. On the
other hand, Brazil's attempts to discourage foreign firms from ac-
quiring domestic firms is probably misguided, at least from an eco-
nomic perspective. If takeovers are forbidden, foreign firms incur
higher costs of entry because they have to construct new plants. If
the foreign firm has superior technology, it can out-compete the
domestic firm in the market place. In this situation, the prohibi-
tion against takeovers causes the domestic firm a capital loss by
depriving its owners of the opportunity to receive going concern
value, as well as the capitalized value of a slice of the profits the
foreign firm intends to earn through its superior technology.""4
Brazil has a legitimate interest in protecting its balance-of-
payments, but the existing system of exchange controls does more
harm than good. The present system has resulted in a thriving
black market, a chronically overvalued cruzeiro, a vast waste of
governmental resources devoted to enforcement, increased transac-
tion costs associated with exports and imports, and the flight
223. Supra, note 123. During 1981 the rate of remittance of profits by foreign investors
was only 3-4 percent of registered investment. Jornal do Brasil, Nov. 12, 1982, 1st cad., at
27, cols. 4-5.
224. Johnson, supra note 221, at 55-56.
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abroad of much needed private capital. The controls make export-
ing difficult without subsidies that regularly engender charges of
GATT violations. The controls also reduce competition in domes-
tic markets. Shifting to a freely floating exchange rate would im-
prove economic efficiency substantially and obviate the need for
restrictions upon profit remittances.225
Nevertheless, profit remittance and exchange controls will
likely remain in force in the foreseeable future because no signifi-
cant political force in Brazil advocates dismantling the present
control system. Therefore, it is useful to consider several piecemeal
reforms that should significantly improve the existing scheme for
regulating foreign investment.
1. The supplemental tax on dividend remittances should be
triggered only by remittances in excess of a floating percentage of
registered capital. This percentage point limitation triggering the
supplemental tax should be set at 5 percentage points above the
LIBOR rate for six-month loans on the last business day of the
month preceding the remittance. Pegging the remittance limitation
to 5 points above LIBOR would automatically adjust it for infla-
tion and changes in the cost of capital, thereby providing a much
fairer yardstick for the foreign investor.
228
2. Registered foreign investment ought to be subjected to
monetary correction in accordance with coefficients drawn from
the consumer price index of the country in whose currency the in-
vestment is registered. This reform would permit the foreign inves-
tor to remit the same real rate of return without incurring supple-
mental tax liability if inflation causes the currency of registry to
depreciate.
3. As an alternative to the supplemental tax, a modest surtax
should be imposed upon remittances of firms engaged in service or
high risk activities. Since service firms, such as accountants, engi-
neers or lawyers, rarely invest significant amounts of capital, they
are unfairly discriminated against by a system of supplemental
taxation triggered by profit remittances in excess of 12 percent of
registered capital. Firms engaged in high risk activities, such as oil
drilling or mineral exploration, suffer a similar form of discrimina-
225. See J. BHAGWATI, ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
82-121 (1978).
226. Peru has recently permitted foreign investors to remit 10 percent points above
LIBOR. See supra note 214.
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tion because the returns on a successful strike must be much
higher than on a normal investment to compensate for the greater
risk. Imposing a 10 percent surtax on the dividend remittances of
these firms as an alternative to the supplemental tax regime would
substantially improve the fairness of the Brazilian scheme.
4. Foreign investors should be permitted to make direct port-
folio investments in the Brazilian stock market and to liquidate or
change their investment at any time. Rational investors contem-
plating investments in a thin market such as Brazil's need to be
able to choose for themselves the companies in which they wish to
invest and to divest at any time. The present requirement that in-
vestments be made through mutual funds and remain in the coun-
try for a fixed period is unrealistic. Another measure that would
help stimulate direct investment in the Brazilian stock market
would be to permit foreign investors to register earnings reinvested
in the shares of Brazilian companies other than the one for which
their foreign investment was originally registered as foreign invest-
ment, and thus, allow them to avoid the 25 percent tax on foreign
remittances. Brazil's present policy of treating such reinvestment
as a dividend remittance is unsound.
5. Brazil ought to reduce the present tax differential between
dividends and interest payments in order to induce more firms to
convert debt into equity. A foreign investor's dividend income is
effectively taxed at 47.5 percent (aggregating the taxes levied on
the Brazilian payor and the foreign recipient and assuming no sup-
plemental tax liability or excess profits tax),2 2 7 while his interest
income is taxed at 25 percent (or 33.3 percent if the onus of paying
the withholding tax is shifted to the borrower by contract). Inter-
est payments are deductible by the payor, and dividend payments
are not. It would, therefore, make sense for Brazil to reduce the
withholding rate to 10 percent on dividend payments to foreign
investors.
6. INPI should be prohibited from refusing to register any pat-
ent licensing agreement because of failure to secure a Brazilian
patent if the application for the Brazilian patent has been pending
for more than one year. INPI needs incentives to register patents
expeditiously, particularly if domestic development of technology
227. This figure is calculated by adding the 25 percent withholding tax levied on the
remaining 70 percent of earnings to the regular 30 percent corporate tax (30 + .25 (70)
47.51.
19831
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
is to be encouraged. The present system encourages delay since
INPI can rationalize its dilatoriness in registering patents as the
conservation of foreign exchange.
7. Foreign investors ought to be allowed to register invest-
ments in technology with the Central Bank without paying a 25
percent tax on their investments. The Central Bank's policy of re-
fusing to permit such registration is arbitrary and discourages ac-
quisition of new technology. Charging a 25 percent tax on an in-
vestment of technology on the theory that royalties have been
symbolically remitted and reinvested is certifiable fiscal insanity.
8. Foreign investors ought to be defined on the basis of nation-
ality rather than residence. Brazilians residing abroad ought not be
considered foreign investors, nor should foreigners residing in Bra-
zil be considered domestic investors. The definition of a foreign in-
vestor used in Brazil's Profit Remittance Law makes sense only in
the context of exchange controls. If Brazil were to shift away from
an exchange control regulatory scheme to one that concentrates on
promoting national development and avoiding economic abuses,
the definition of a foreign investor should be significantly altered.
9. Brazil ought to promote competition among industrial firms
by enforcing its antitrust laws more vigorously and by reducing its
high protective tariff barriers. In its twenty years of existence, the
Administrative Council for the Defense of the Economy (CADE),
the agency entrusted with the enforcement of Brazil's antitrust
laws, has brought only 69 cases. Only 36 cases have gone to trial,
and only 7 have resulted in judgments against defendant compa-
nies.12 8 CADE has been so ineffective that it has been widely re-
garded as moribund. If the federal government permitted CADE to
operate effectively, or relaxed Brazil's high tariff laws, Brazilian
consumers would be the beneficiaries of lower prices. The infant
industry argument for maintaining high tariffs may have made
sense in Brazil during the 1940s and 1950s, but it makes little
sense in 1983.
10. SEI should be relieved of the power to veto foreign invest-
ment and technology in the computer field. Access to the most
modern computer technology is critical if Brazilian industry is to
become competitive in world markets. Creating monopolies for
Brazilian computer companies may ultimately prove as disastrous
to Brazilian development as the creation of a government monop-
228. Jornal do Brasil, Dec. 5, 1982, 1st cad., at 45, cola. 1-2.
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oly in oil exploration.
V. CONCLUSION
Brazil's regulatory scheme for foreign investment is a hodge-
podge of exchange control, income tax, technology transfer and
stock market measures. The scheme suffers from serious concep-
tual and administrative problems that could be ameliorated by the
adoption of the reforms suggested above. Yet any major overhaul
of the existing scheme is likely to generate highly charged national-
istic debates that might well result in much worse legislation. De-
spite its imperfections, the Brazilian regulatory scheme has worked
tolerably well in practice. It has provided ample work for lawyers,
despachantes and bureaucrats, without greatly reducing the
amount of foreign investment. Unfortunately, its chief economic
effects are adding to Brazil's bloated price structure by increasing
transaction costs and foreclosing competition, and hindering Brazil
from obtaining the technological edge necessary to make its manu-
factured products competitive in world markets. During its period
of economic boom, the Profit Remittance Law was a luxury that
Brazil could afford. In its present economic crisis, Brazil ought to
consider seriously the prospect of relegating it to the statutory
scrapheap and thoroughly revamping the scheme by which it regu-
lates foreign investment.t
t During publication of this article, Brazil modified the supplemental tax on foreign
remittances that exceed 12 percent of registered capital. Decree-Law No. 2.073 of December
21, 1983, makes the taxable event the distribution rather than the remittance of dividends
to the foreign investor. It also shortens the period for payment of the tax from 30 days after
the close of the fiscal year to 60 days after the distribution of the dividend.
Because the exemption from supplemental tax for reinvestment in Brazil has been re-
tained, shifting the taxable event from remittance of dividends to their distribution is rela-
tively insignificant. Foreign investors seldom receive cruzeiro distributions that are neither
remitted nor reinvested in Brazil. The significant change is the increase in the effective tax
rate from requiring payment of the supplemental tax within 60 days; under the prior system
the tax payment tax could be deferred for nearly a year if the dividend were remitted early
in the declarant's fiscal year. With an inflation rate in excess of 200 percent, the privilege of
deferring payment of the tax until the next fiscal year reduced the effective supplemental
tax rates by as much as 75 percent. Under the current regime of Central Bank Resolution
851, which centralizes all sales of foreign exchange in the Central Bank, the supplemental
tax may have to be paid long before foreign exchange becomes available to remit the
dividend.
From a purely revenue-preservation standpoint, Decree-Law No. 2.073 makes eminent
sense. From an international standpoint, Decree Law No. 2.073 is a good example of the
current regime's uncanny ability to shoot itself in the foot by sending precisely the wrong
signal to nervous foreign investors at a time when Brazil desperately needs to increase the
capital inflows from foreign investment.
